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ABSTRACT
EARNINGS EXTRAPOLATION AND PREDICTABLE STOCK MARKET RETURNS
Hongye Guo
Robert Stambaugh
The U.S. stock market’s return during the first month of a quarter correlates strongly with
returns in future months, but the correlation is negative if the future month is the first month
of a quarter, and positive if it is not. These effects offset, leaving the market return with
its weak unconditional predictive ability known to the literature. The pattern accords with
a model in which investors extrapolate announced earnings to predict future earnings, not
recognizing that earnings in the first month of a quarter are inherently less predictable than
in other months. Survey data support this model, as does out-of-sample return predictability
across industries and international markets. These results challenge the Efficient Market
Hypothesis and advance a novel mechanism of expectation formation.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

iv

LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

vi

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
CHAPTER 1 : Earnings Extrapolation and Predictable Stock Market
Returns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

1.1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

1.2

Related literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5

1.3

Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9

1.4

Predicting the US aggregate market returns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

1.5

Intuition and earnings predictability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

1.6

Stylized model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

1.7

Additional tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

1.8

Alternative explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

1.9

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

CHAPTER 2 : Tables and Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.1

Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

2.2

Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

v

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE
TABLE
TABLE
TABLE
TABLE

2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5

Company-fiscal period count by fiscal period end month . . . . . .
US company-quarter count by reporting month . . . . . . . . . . .
Lead-lag relations of US monthly market returns . . . . . . . . . .
Lead-lag relations of US monthly market returns, across subsamples
Lead-lag relations of US monthly market returns, actual vs simulated

.
.
.
.

46
47
48
49

TABLE
TABLE
TABLE
TABLE
TABLE
TABLE

2.6
2.7
2.8
2.9
2.10
2.11

data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lead-lag relations of US monthly earnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
No reversal in the pre-season portion of the newsy months . . . . .
Weak dynamic autocorrelation in Q1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Survey evidence from IBES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lead-lag relations of monthly excess industry returns in the US . .
Lead-lag relations of monthly excess industry returns in US, by dif-

.
.
.
.
.
.

50
51
52
53
54
55

TABLE
TABLE
TABLE
TABLE
TABLE
TABLE
TABLE
TABLE
TABLE
TABLE

2.12
2.13
2.14
2.15
2.16
2.17
2.18
2.19
2.20
2.21

ferent industry measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lead-lag relations of monthly excess industry earnings in US . . . . .
Heterogeneous effect across industries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Placebo test: no effect on fake ‘industries’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Newsyness of Q2 in US across various half lives . . . . . . . . . . . .
Quantitative newsyness and performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Global company-fiscal period count by reporting month group . . . .
Lead-lag relations of monthly earnings in other countries . . . . . . .
Lead-lag relations of monthly market returns in other countries . . .
Lead-lag relations of monthly market excess returns in other countries
Lead-lag relations of monthly industry excess earnings in other coun-

56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

tries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
TABLE 2.22 Lead-lag relations of monthly industry excess returns in other countries
TABLE 2.23 Lead-lag relations of monthly market returns in US, by decades . . .
TABLE 2.24 Predicting US aggregate market returns with real time coefficients . .

66
67
68
69

TABLE A.1 Evidence supporting correlation neglect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
TABLE C.1 Time series strategies and alphas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
TABLE C.2 Cross sectional strategies and alphas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

vi

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURE 2.1

Timing of independent and dependent variables in return forecast-

FIGURE 2.2

ing regressions, US . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Next month’s market returns vs past four newsy month returns, by

FIGURE 2.3
FIGURE 2.4

whether the next month is newsy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Autoregressive coefficients of US monthly aggregate market returns 73
Distance in calendar and fiscal time of lagged data in an earnings
forecasting setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

vii

CHAPTER 1
Earnings Extrapolation and Predictable Stock Market
Returns
1.1. Introduction
Predicting stock market returns with past returns is famously difficult. Kendall and Hill
(1953) and Fama (1965) documented decades ago that serial correlations in stock returns
are close to zero. In his seminal work, Fama (1970) defines the weakest form of the Efficient
Market Hypothesis as that prices reflect all information in past prices. This hypothesis
appears to work especially well for the US aggregate market. Poterba and Summers (1988)
show, for example, that monthly market returns in the US have a small, insignificant positive
autocorrelation over a horizon of 12 months. The lack of correlation between past and future
market returns in the US is not only a widely accepted statistical phenomenon, but also an
emblem of market efficiency.
I document that the US market return in the first month of a quarter in fact strongly
correlates with returns in future months, with the correlation being strongly negative if the
forecasted month is the first month of a quarter (i.e. January, April, July, and October)
and strongly positive if it is not. This result can be understood as a two-step refinement of
regressing one month’s return on past 12 months’ return. The first step is to condition on
the timing of the dependent variable. The market return in the first month of a quarter is
strongly negatively predicted by the return in the preceding 12 months, whereas the returns
in the second and third months of the quarter are strongly positively predicted by the past
12 months’ return. This distinction is already strong, highly significant at the one percent
level, but it becomes even stronger after taking the second step—refining the independent
variable. Specifically, among any 12 consecutive months, exactly 4 are first months of a
quarter, and these 4 months are especially useful for predicting future returns.
These first months of a quarter are special and important to investors because they con1

tain fresh earnings news. This is due to the nature of the earnings cycle in the US. Take
January as an example. At the end of the December, firms close their books for Q4, and
they announce Q4 earnings in January, February, and March. January therefore contains
the early earnings announcements and is the first time that investors learn about the economy’s performance in Q4. February and March also contain a sizable fraction of earnings
announcements, but by that time investors have already learned much about Q4. The first
months of the quarters are famously known as the “earnings seasons” among practitioners
and receive heightened attention. Throughout this paper, I refer to them as “newsy” months,
as they produce fresh earnings news. I call the other 8 months “non-newsy” months.
I hypothesize that the above pattern of market return predictability arises from imperfectly rational investors who extrapolate newsy month earnings to predict earnings in future
months but fail to account for the inherent variation of such predictability across these future months. Because earnings autocorrelate across multiple fiscal quarters, this practice
of extrapolation is broadly correct. However, earnings announced in the newsy months are
more difficult to predict than those announced in other months. This is because in the
newsy months firms report on a new fiscal period, and these earnings naturally have lower
correlation with past earnings. This lower correlation is the concrete meaning of fresh earnings news. On the other hand, earnings in the non-newsy months have higher correlation
with the past. A rational investor should accordingly predict with a time-varying parameter. However, if the investor fails to recognize this variation and extrapolates with the
average parameter value instead, then good news in the past predicts negative surprises in
future newsy months and positive surprises in future non-newsy months. These predictable
surprises then give rise to predictable return reversal (continuation) in newsy (non-newsy)
months. Furthermore, even as investors naively extrapolate, their expectations will tend
to shift more in newsy months, making the returns in those months especially useful in
predicting future returns.
Having stated my hypothesis, I test its immediate predictions. I start by showing that the

2

serial correlation structure of aggregate earnings, as measured by aggregate return on equity
(ROE), is indeed significantly lower in the newsy months. This evidence substantiates one
premise of my hypothesis. I then show with survey data from IBES that sell-side analysts
indeed fail to account fully for this variation in earnings autocorrelation, consequently leaving different types of predictability in earnings surprises through the earnings cycle. This
evidence is uniquely useful because survey data are direct measures of market expectations,
albeit imperfect. Moreover, I show that the predictable reversals in aggregate market returns do not occur until the earnings seasons begin. This alignment in timing suggests that
it is indeed the earnings seasons that drive the return predictability, as opposed to other
quarterly fluctuations unrelated to earnings announcements.
The return predictability results of this paper are motivated by, but not constrained to,
the time-series setting. In additional to predictions confirmed in the time series setting, my
theory also makes predictions about cross sections. In particular, the imperfect extrapolation
mechanism that I propose potentially applies to the cross sections of industries and countries.
Motivated by these natural extensions, I uncover a similar return predictability pattern in the
cross section of industry excess returns.1 Continuation in the cross section of stock returns,
as in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), has also been extensively studied. Unlike the weak
continuation found in the US aggregate market, momentum in excess stock returns is a much
stronger and more robust effect (e.g., Asness et al. (2013)), and the industry component is
shown to drive a large fraction of it (Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999)). This paper shows
that the strength of the continuation in the cross section of industry returns also varies over
time. Similar to the results found in the aggregate market, industry momentum is strong
in the non-newsy months but virtually non-existent in the newsy months. Moreover, this
dynamic momentum pattern is very strong in industries with tightly connected fundamentals
and weak in loosely connected industries, as my theory predicts. Additionally, I find a similar
pattern in country momentum (Moskowitz et al. (2012), Garg et al. (2021)), and in country1

It technically also exists in the cross section of stock returns. The effect however operates entirely
through the industry components of these stock returns.
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industry momentum. This consistency across multiple contexts is remarkable and not always
seen in studies of return predictability. These cross-sectional results not only expand the
scope of this paper, but also provide important out-of-sample evidence.2
I also note that it seems difficult to explain the return predictability results with a risk-based
framework. Presumably, in such a framework, after a good newsy month the future newsy
months would be safe, but the future non-newsy months would be risky. Moreover, expected
market returns implied by my results are frequently negative, so consequently a risk-based explanation would imply that the stock market is frequently safer than cash. However, common
macro-based risk measures such as the surplus consumption ratio (Campbell and Cochrane
(1999)) do not vary strongly at the monthly frequency, and even if they do, they are unlikely
to be able to make the stock market safer than cash. Therefore, the most natural explanation for the novel predictability documented in this paper involves investors who make
mistake. Such an explanation likely resides in the area of behavioral finance.
Fama (1998) makes an important critique of behavioral finance, which is that in this literature, return reversal and continuation appear about equally frequently, and the evidence
accords with the Efficient Market Hypothesis if viewed together. This paper provides a
response to this critique by predicting when return continuation and reversal occur. The response is specific to the context of the earnings reporting cycle, but the latter is an important
and universal aspect of the financial market that leads to strong return predictability across
multiple contexts. The evidence in this paper together speaks in favor of a novel mechanism
of expectation formation, which features fundamentals extrapolation with a “representative
parameter” in lieu of a correct, time-varying parameter.
2

The most common approach of out-of-sample analysis in the context of return predictability is that in
Mclean and Pontiff (2016) and Hou et al. (2018), which look at a signal’s performance after its publication.
This is by definition not something that one can run at the time of publication. Another approach is that
utilized by Jensen et al. (2021), which involves looking at a larger and significantly different dataset, such as
one consisting of different countries. Here, I am taking this second approach. Incidentally, another concept of
‘out-of-sample’ involves removing look-ahead-bias in the parameter estimation process. This is a point made
by Goyal and Welch (2008) and is especially relevant to time-series signals. I will address this important
point later in my paper, but ‘out-of-sample’ has a different meaning in their context.

4

The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 1.2 relates this paper to the existing
literature. Section 1.3 describes my data. Section 1.4 demonstrates the key return predictability results in US market returns. Section 1.5 provides intuition behind those results,
and it substantiates the intuition using fundamental data. Section 1.6 provides a simple
stylized model with closed-form solutions that qualitatively illustrate the intuition in Section 1.5. Section 1.7 performs supplementary analyses to test my theory in further depth.
Section 1.8 discusses alternative explanations. Section 1.9 concludes.

1.2. Related literature
This study relates to various ares of existing literature, beyond the branch that directly
focuses on return autocorrelation. My theoretical framework relates to a large body of
work in behavioral finance that focuses on the notions of under-, and over-reaction, which
naturally lead to predictable return continuation and reversal. However, relatively few
paper has a model that simultaneously features under- and over-reaction, both of which
are necessary for my purpose. Such a framework would be useful, as it informs us under
what circumstances should one observe under- rather than overreaction. Barberis et al.
(1998) is a prominent piece of early work that achieves this. Starting with an earnings
process that follows a random walk, they show that if investors incorrectly believe that the
autocorrelation structure of this earnings process is dynamic—specifically, that the structure
follows a two-state regime-switching model featuring continuation and reversal—then they
will overreact to news that seems to be in a sequence, and underreact to news that seems
not. My framework uses the opposite mechanism as that in Barberis et al. (1998). In my
model, the autocorrelation of earnings process is actually dynamic, but investors incorrectly
believe it is constant.
It is worth noting that while the broader logic behind such a mechanism is relatively new
in the literature, the paper is not alone in employing it. Specifically, Matthies (2018) finds
that beliefs about covariance exhibit compression towards moderate values in the context
of natural gas and electric futures, as well as macroeconomic forecasts. Wang (2020) doc-
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uments autocorrelation compression in the context of the yield curve. Behind our papers
is a particular bounded-rationality mechanism where investors’ limited cognitive capacity
prevents them from fully exploring the heterogeneity of a parameter, leading them to simply
use a moderate representative value instead.
This paper contributes to the literature on fundamentals extrapolation (Lakonishok et al.
(1994), Greenwood and Hanson (2013), Nagel and Xu (2019)). An important mechanism
behind extrapolative practices is diagnostic expectations (for example Bordalo et al. (2019),
Bordalo et al. (2020), Bordalo et al. (2021b)). Investors who form expectations diagnostically overestimate the probabilities of the states that have recently become more likely,
resulting in overall over-extrapolation.3 In my framework, the level of extrapolation is moderate and correct on average. However, the level is incorrect in a specific month, as the
earnings announced in that month will have either higher or lower correlation with past
earnings than expected. Under- and over-extrapolation coexist in my framework. They are
just targeting earnings of different months.
This paper relates also to work on predictable yet eventually surprising fundamental changes,
e.g. Hartzmark and Solomon (2013) and Chang et al. (2017). This line of works shows that
events that discretely yet predictably break from the past, e.g. issuing of large dividends
or having seasonally high earnings, can still surprise investors and lead to positive excess
returns on the corresponding firms. Extending this intuition to the aggregate market, one
can understand the earnings announcements early in the earnings reporting cycles as trend
breaking events, as the announced earnings have discretely yet predictably lower correlation
with past earnings. If investors also fail to anticipate this drop, we will observe reversals of
aggregate returns in the newsy months. Hence, this line of literature is especially relevant
to the reversal arm in the dynamic serial correlation of the stock returns.
A feature of my model is that investors do not fully appreciate the correlation between
earnings revealed early and late in the earnings reporting cycle. Enke and Zimmermann
3

Diagnostic expectation has a psychological root, e.g. Bordalo et al. (2021a).
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(2017) show in an experimental setting that subjects fail to discount correlated news despite
the simple setup and extensive instructions and control questions. Fedyk and Hodson (2019)
document that old ‘news’ on Bloomberg terminals—especially ones that combine multiple
sources and are not direct reprints—generates overreactions in the abnormal returns of the
associated stocks that are corrected in the subsequent days. The continuation arm of my
results shares this theme, even though my results are on the aggregate level and over a
longer horizon (monthly).4 It is worth noting that even though the literature of correlation
neglect and predictable fundamentals can individually explain the continuation and reversal
arms of the returns, having a single explanation, i.e. parameter moderation, for both arms
still adds meaningfully to the behavioral finance literature.
This paper also falls into the broader literature that studies the interaction between earnings announcements and stock returns (e.g., Beaver (1968), Bernard and Thomas (1989),
Bernard and Thomas (1990), Chen et al. (2020b), Johnson et al. (2020)). An important
piece of recent work in this area is Savor and Wilson (2016), which focuses on weekly stock
returns. The authors first confirm that stocks have high returns on earnings announcementweek (as in Beaver (1968)), and additionally show that stocks that have high announcementweek returns in the past are likely to have high announcement-week returns in the future.
Among other things, the authors also show that early announcers earn higher returns than
late announcers, and firms that are expected to announce in the near-term future have
higher betas with respect to the announcing portfolios. Overall, the authors make a convincing case that earnings announcements of individual firms resolve systematic risks that
have implications for the broader market.
Instead of the risks and the mean (excess) returns associated with earnings announcements,
my paper focuses on the under- and over-reaction that are potentially related to them, as
well as the resulting lead-lag relation of stock returns. Also, instead of the returns of the
portfolio that long the announcing firms and short the non-announcing firms, I focus on
4

My framework and correlation neglect predict different forms of return reversal. This is discussed in
more details in Appendix A.
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the aggregate market returns or the industry-level returns in excess of the market, neither
of which strongly correlate with the spread between the announcing and non-announcing
portfolios. In addition to these high level distinctions, specific differences in empirical results
will be further discussed later in Section 1.8.
This paper also relates to the broad literature studying the seasonality of stock returns, documented by Heston and Sadka (2008) and extended by Keloharju et al. (2016). This literature also studies the autocorrelation of stock returns, and makes the point that full-year lags
have especially strong predictive power, which is a distinction of the independent variable.
The main point of my paper, however, is that the predictive power of past returns is different
according to the timing of the dependent variable. Philosophically, Heston and Sadka (2008)
and Keloharju et al. (2016) are consistent with the notion of stationarity of stock returns,
while my paper challenges it—specifically, the notion that the autocorrelation coefficients
depend on displacement and not time. Again, specific distinctions will be further discussed
in Section 1.8.
The portion of this paper studying the industry level returns relates to a large accounting
literature studying the information transfer within industry. Foster (1981) first documented
that earnings announcements have strong impact on stock prices of other firms in the same
industry. Clinch and Sinclair (1987) confirm and extend this result on a sample of Australian firms; Han and Wild (1990) and Hann et al. (2019) confirm similar results using
alternative measures of information; Han et al. (1989) and Brochet et al. (2018) do so with
alternative announcements. Related, the literature has also documented that such learning
is often imperfect and lead to predictable errors: Ramnath (2002) documents that news
announced by the first announcer in the industry positively predicts surprises in subsequent
announcements in the same industry, and argues that investors underreact to these first
announcements; Thomas and Zhang (2008) confirm this finding, but additionally point out
that within the same industry, the late announcers’ excess returns during early announcers’
announcements negatively predict these late announcers’ own announcement excess returns.

8

This suggests that investors overreact to these early announcements.56 My paper differs
from this literature on several aspects: It focuses on industry level excess returns as opposed
to stock level in the context of both the independent and the dependent variables. Also,
the frequency I focus on is monthly, as opposed to daily. Lastly, I am interested in both
intra-quarter and cross-quarter relations, as opposed to just the former. My paper therefore
provides additional value to the accounting literature.

1.3. Data
In terms of data sources, in the US, my return data come from CRSP, accounting data come
from Compustat North America, and EPS forecast data come from IBES Detail History
(adjusted). These are common data sources used by a large number of studies. There are
two main sources of earnings announcement dates in the US: Compustat and IBES. Both
data sources have been individually used in major studies. These announcement days often
disagree, though the disagreements are usually small and are mostly concentrated before
December 1994 (see Dellavigna and Pollet (2009), for instance, for a discussion). For my
purpose, this source of discrepancy is unlikely to make a difference, but out of an abundance
of caution, I implement the algorithm in Dellavigna and Pollet (2009), which combines the
Compustat and the IBES announcement dates to form the best estimate of the actual
announcement dates.7 In the event that the adjusted announcement date is the same as
the IBES announcement date, I also shift the date to the next trading date if the IBES
announcement time is after the market closure. This follows Johnson and So (2018a), who
implement the same algorithm.
Outside US, my stock level return data mainly come from Compustat Global. The only
5

The two seemingly contradictory results both exist and are in fact quite robust in my replication. Their
appearance of conflict highlights the imprecision in using under/overreaction to describe return predictability
patterns. The two patterns can naturally be explained together with one story, which is that investors
correctly extrapolate information from these early announcers, but fail to distinguish between industry level
information, which they should extrapolate, and idiosyncratic information, which thy should not.
6
Figure 1 of Thomas and Zhang (2008) cleanly summarizes the variety of predictability in this space.
7
The algorithm is effectively 1) when the two sources differ use the earlier date and 2) when they agree
and the date is before Jan 1, 1990 shift the day to the previous trading date. Please see Dellavigna and Pollet
(2009) for further details.
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exceptions are Canadian data, which come from Compustat North America. My country
level return data come from Global Financial Data (GFD). The reason why I use two different data sources of returns is that GFD provides country level return data with longer
history, and Compustat provides the stock level data that I need for industry level studies.
Compared to those focusing on the US market, studies employing global accounting data
and global earnings announcement dates are in smaller numbers. However, there are still
many prominent papers (e.g. Asness et al. (2019), Jensen et al. (2021)), from which two
data sources emerge: Compustat Global and Thomson Reuters Worldscope. I compared
the two data sources. Both of them have good coverage of annual accounting data, but
Worldscope provides substantially better coverage of quarterly and semi-annual accounting
data than Compustat Global. Also, Worldscope records about 2 times as many earnings
announcements. These two factors are especially important for my purpose. I therefore
use Worldscope for my study. I use exchange rate data from Bloomberg to convert foreign
currency denominated accounting data and stock returns into US dollar denominated ones.
In terms of specific variables used, in the US, I use ‘value-weighted average return’ (vwretd)
to represent aggregate market returns, and SIC code to represent industries. I use ‘Report
Date of Quarterly Earnings’ (rdq from Compustat) and ‘Announcement Date, Actual’ (anndats_act from IBES) for earnings announcement dates, ‘Common/Ordinary Equity–Total’
(ceqq) for book value of equity, and ‘Income Before Extraordinary Items’ (ibq) for earnings.
Globally, I use item 5905 from Worldscope for earnings announcement dates, item 1551 for
earnings, and item 7220 for book value of equity.8

1.4. Predicting the US aggregate market returns
In this section, I first describe the earnings reporting cycle in the US and then demonstrate
that the serial correlation in the US aggregate market returns varies strongly within this
cycle. For ease of expression, I first define three groups of months: “Group 1" contains
8
It is useful to note that the data are obtained by directly querying the ‘wsddata’ and ‘wsndata’ tables
of Worldscope. Using the Wharton Research Data Services’ web query forms to download the data might
result in incorrect exclusion of semi-annual accounting data (those keyed with freq of ‘S’).
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January, April, July, and October, “Group 2" February, May, August, and November, and
“Group 3" March, June, September, and December. They are the first, second, and the third
months of quarters, respectively. In the US, I will call group 1 months the “newsy" months.
The reason that they are called newsy is they are when fresh news on firm earnings comes
out intensively. The news is fresh because group 1 months immediately follow the end of
the fiscal quarters, the majority of which are aligned with the calendar quarters. This is
demonstrated in Table 2.1, which shows that in the US, about 85% of fiscal quarters end
in the group 3 months. Moreover, Table 2.2 shows that in the US, about half of the firms
announce within one month after the end of a fiscal period. In fact, among all of the three
types of months, most firms announce in group 1 months. Therefore, group 1 months are
when fresh news is reported intensively. The two features of freshness and intensity are the
concrete meanings of the word “newsy.” These newsy months largely correspond to the socalled ‘earnings seasons’, which is a term frequently used by practitioners. The bottom line
is that in terms of the earnings news, in the US, group 1 months are the information-relevant
months.
Having understood why these group 1 months are special, we look at Table 2.3, which
reports results of the following monthly time-series regression that predicts the aggregate
P
US stock market return: mktt = α + 4j=1 βj mktnm(t,j) + ϵt . Here mktnm(t,j) is the j th
“newsy" month return strictly before the month t. Unless otherwise noted, returns on those
newsy months are put on the right-hand side of the regressions throughout my empirical
analyses. Figure 2.1 thoroughly illustrates how lagging is done on the regression: Suppose
the dependent variable is the return of November, then lag 1 newsy month (abbrv. lag 1nm)
return is that of October, lag 2nm return is that of July and so on. As the dependent variable
moves forward to December and January of the next year, the lagged newsy month returns
on the right-hand side stay the same. However, when the dependent variable becomes the
return of February, the lag 1nm return will move forward by three months to January, as
that is the most recent newsy month strictly before February.
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Having clarified the specifics of the regressions we move on to the results. Column 1 of
Table 2.3 confirms the conventional view that the aggregate stock market exhibits only weak
momentum with a look-back window of one year. Column 2 does the same regression, but
only on the 1/3 of the sample where the dependent variables are returns of the newsy months.
This column shows that in newsy months, returns are decidedly negatively correlated with
past newsy month returns. Column 3 does the regression for the rest of the sample, where
the dependent variables are returns of non-newsy months. In those months, returns are
positively correlated with past newsy month returns. However, on average they cancel each
other out, resulting in the weak unconditional predictive coefficients shown in column 1.
The main empirical finding of this paper is that the serial predictive relation in stock returns
varies by the timing of the dependent variable. Column 4 delivers this main point by showing
the difference in the coefficients of columns 2 and 3. While the differences are not monotonic
with lags, they are clearly all negative, and overall the effect is stronger the smaller the
lag. To evaluate the strength of the effect in different contexts, such as different historical
periods, it is useful to have one coefficient instead of four. Throughout the empirical section,
P
I use the sum of the first four lags, or 4j=1 mktnm(t,j) , as the flagship signal. Since four
lags correspond to the typical one-year look-back window of the various price momentum
strategies, when I get to the cross section this choice will enable me to benchmark against
those strategies and speak to when they work and don’t work.
P
Table 2.4 focuses on the following regression: mktt = α + β 4j=1 mktnm(t,j) + ϵt . Here
P4
j=1 mktnm(t,j) is the sum of the lag 1 to lag 4 newsy month returns, the said flagship
signal. Its coefficient here roughly corresponds to the average of the first four coefficients9
in Table 2.3. Column 1 shows the weak unconditional time-series momentum, pushed over
the p-value cutoff of 5% by putting only the newsy month returns on the right-hand side
(regressing on the past 12-month return will result in a t-stat of 0.60). Column 2 and 3
are the subsamples for newsy months and non-newsy months returns. Again we see strong
9

This approximate relation works for returns but not in general.
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negative predictive coefficients in newsy months and strong positive coefficients in nonnewsy months. The difference in the coefficients, -0.232, is shown in the interaction term of
column 4 with a t-stat of -4.93. These two values indicate that in the full CRSP sample of
1926-2021, the serial predictive relation of the US aggregate market return is strongly time
varying. Columns 5-7 show that these results are strong in the post-WWII period, first half,
and second half of the sample, though the effect is stronger in the first half of the sample.
Figure 2.2 compactly represents the results above. The red bars from left to right show
that market returns during past newsy months negatively predict returns in future newsy
months. The blue bars show that the relation flips if it is the non-newsy months that are
being predicted.
It is worth noting that because the predictor in the regression consists of newsy month
returns, when the dependent variable is newsy, it is further away from the predictor in
terms of calendar time. In column 2 of Table 2.4, the predictor is on average 7.5 calendar
months away from the dependent variable. In column 3, the distance is only 6 calendar
months away. If return autocorrelation is greater the smaller the calendar lags, then the
difference of 1.5 months can potentially contribute the difference between column 2 and 3
of Table 2.4.
To investigate the impact of calendar month lags on return autocorrelation, I perform a
multiple regression of monthly aggregate market returns on its 12 calendar month lags.
Figure 2.3 plots the resulting autoregressive coefficients. Notice that the fitted line across
the lags is almost horizontal, with a slope of -0.00062. This shows that within the horizon
of 12 calendar months—which is what is relevant for our regressions in Table 2.4, there is
little relation between the calendar lag and autocorrelation. A slope of -0.00062 per lag,
combined with a total difference of 1.5 × 4 = 6 calendar month lags, produces a product
of -0.004. This is substantially smaller than the difference of -0.232 shown in column 4 of
Table 2.4.
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Even though there isn’t an appreciable association between return autocorrelation and calendar month lags, Figure 2.3 does show a positive autoregressive coefficient of 0.11 for the
very first lag. This coefficient is in fact significant at the conventional 5% level. One may
then worry that perhaps this first lag in itself drives the results in Table 2.4. To investigate
whether this is the case, I run 10,000 simulations of AR(1) process with the autocorrelation
being 0.11, and then run the regressions in Table 2.4 on each set of simulated sample of
1,136 monthly observations. Table 2.5 juxtaposes regressions done on real data with those
done on simulated data. Column 1-3 are regression results on real data. Column 4-6 report
averages of 10,000 regression coefficients, each of which is computed on a simulated sample.
Column 1 repeats the previously shown main result, featuring a highly significantly negative
coefficient of -0.232 on the interaction term. Column 4 is the corresponding regression done
on simulated data. Here we instead observe a much smaller coefficient of -0.019 that is also
not anywhere close to significance on samples of the same size. This evidence suggests that
the difference in calendar lags does not drive my results.
One may still be curious on how the regressions behave if we simply use trailing 12 month
returns as predictors, which holds the calendar lag constant, as opposed to trailing four
newsy month returns, which do not. Column 2 of Table 2.5 does exactly that. Here we
see that the results remain highly significant at 1% level,10 even though less significant
than those in column 1. Column 3 breaks down the trailing 12 month returns into the
trailing 4 newsy month and the trailing 8 non-newsy month return. It shows that while
market return’s correlation with the past returns are generally lower when the dependent
variable is newsy, from the perspective of independent variable, past newsy months are
mainly responsible for this dynamic predictive relation. The interaction term for the nonnewsy months also gets a negative coefficient of -0.031, which means that similar dynamic
predictability pattern also exists with respect to past non-newsy months. This relation,
however, is weak. Consequently, the specification in column 2 behaves like column 1, except
10
It is worth mentioning the results in later sections also remain significant if we use trailing 12 month
returns.
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with more noise in the predictor. As we will see in the following sections, the proposed
explanation for this pattern naturally applies better to the newsy months.
Lastly, one may wonder if this predictability can be profitably translated into a trading
strategy that is implementable in real time. This is indeed a concern especially relevant
for time series predictors. In fact, Goyal and Welch (2008) show that certain predictors
of aggregate market return appear to work with full-sample information, but fail when
implemented with information available in real time. In Appendix C, I construct a realtime, beta-neutral strategy based on the return predictability result documented in this
section, and show that it leads to a information ratio of 0.44. This is about the same as
the Sharpe ratio on aggregate market itself, and the trading strategy does not load on the
market. The strategy’s CAPM and Fama-French-Carhart four factor alphas are about 9%
per annum. The results in Appendix C show that the predictability pattern documented in
this paper can indeed be profitability translated into a trading strategy.

1.5. Intuition and earnings predictability
1.5.1. Intuition
In the past section, we saw that aggregate stock market returns in newsy months have
lower correlation with past returns, and those in non-newsy months have higher correlation
with past returns. This difference in correlation exists in multiple newsy month lags. In this
section, I first provide intuitions on the reasons underlying this return predictability pattern,
and then substantiate the premises behind these intuitions with fundamentals data.
Consider the following narrative: suppose investors forecast earnings outcome in the upcoming months based on past earnings. To fix idea, suppose that they have just observed
positive earnings news in April from the announcing firms, and are (re)assessing their forecasts in May, June, and July. Because earnings are positively autocorrelated—which we
will show in the next subsection—investors correctly think that earnings in the upcoming
months are also good. In fact, earnings announced in May and June are especially likely
to be good. This is because the announcing firms in those months are also announcing on
15

Q1—perhaps Q1 is just a good quarter for everyone.
However, in July, earnings of Q2, a different fiscal quarter, will be announced. Since earnings
are positively autocorrelated across multiple fiscal quarters, the numbers in July are still
likely good, as Q2 and Q1 are only one fiscal quarter apart. However, earnings announced
in May and June are zero fiscal quarter apart from that in April. Therefore, compared to
those in May and June, earnings in July are less likely to resemble that in April. If investors
fail to fully anticipate this discrete drop in earnings similarity, they will be disappointed in
July. On the other hand, if they do not fully realize that the earnings in May and June are
going to be especially good, they will be positively surprised in those months.11
To see why multiple lags can be significant in column 4 of Table 2.3, notice that if investors
only forecast earnings in the next 3 months, then only one newsy month lag should be
operative. If investors forecast more months ahead, say 6, then good news back in January
would have led to higher earnings expectations in May, June, and July—assuming that
these initial reactions are not fully reversed before these target months.12 These higher
expectations are again correct in direction as earnings in May and June is only 1 fiscal
quarter apart from that in January. In July, the distance becomes 2 fiscal quarters. If
investors again treat this discrete drop in similarity as gradual, then good news in January
would also correspond to positive surprises in May and June, and disappointment in July.
The story above narrates from the perspective of a given forecasting month. Pivoting to
a given target month, the equivalent intuition is that aggregate earnings announced in the
newsy months naturally have lower correlation with past earnings, since announcers in those
11

Thomson Reuters, which operates the IBES system, organize earnings forecasts with the ‘FQx’ labels,
where FQ1 represents the closet fiscal quarter in the future for which the earnings have not been announced.
FQ2 represents the 2nd closet fiscal quarter, and so forth. After an early announcer announce, say, in April,
its next quarter earning—which is likely to be announced in July—will take the label FQ1. Notice earnings
that will be announced in May and June also have the label FQ1. Those who participate in the Thomson
Reuters’ system and also use the result of this announcement to inform their future forecasts can potentially
be nudged to think of May, June, and July together by this shared label.
12
This is an important assumption with an implication that I will verify with survey data: initial surprises
should correspond to predictable surprises in the target months, as opposed to be fully corrected before the
target months.
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months are announcing on a new fiscal quarter. This makes the earnings in newsy months
further away from past earnings in terms of fiscal time, holding constant the distance in
calendar time.13 On the other hand, earnings in non-newsy months have higher correlation
with past earnings. Consider investors who forecast next-month earnings using past earnings:
If they treat the next month as an average month, i.e., they do not sufficiently distinguish
whether the next month is newsy or non-newsy, then when past earnings have been good, in
the upcoming newsy months the investors are likely to be disappointed, and in the upcoming
non-newsy months they are likely to see positive surprises.
The behavior that I propose above can be compactly described as fundamentals extrapolation with a representative parameter. In the language of under- and over-reaction, this
behavior implies that investors overreact when forecasting the earnings announced in future newsy months, and underreact when forecasting future non-newsy months earnings.
Additionally, those newsy months are very natural time for investors to revise their forecasts of future earnings. Hence, the initial mis-reactions are likely more concentrated in
the newsy months themselves. As the forecasted earnings are later announced, the initial
misreactions get corrected, and return continuation and reversal emerge. Not only do the
newsy (non-newsy) month returns correlate negatively (positively) with past returns in general, they correlate especially negatively (positively) with past newsy-month returns. This
mis-reaction concentration feature does not endogenously arise from my framework of representative parameter. It is nonetheless an intuitive feature that the return data speak in
favor of. I discuss how to formally incorporate this feature in the modeling section.
13

The distinction between fiscal and calendar time is illustrated in Figure 2.4. For example, focusing on
news in the lag 1 calendar quarter: when the forecasted month is group 1, the average fiscal time between the
news in the forecasted month and that in the past calendar quarter is 1 fiscal quarter. When the forecasted
month is group 2, the average distance shortens to 2/3 fiscal quarter, and for group 3 it is only 1/3 fiscal
quarter. Note this relation holds for more than one lagged calendar quarter. The overarching message is that
when investors are trying to forecast the earnings in the upcoming months, past information is more/less
timely the later/earlier in the earnings reporting cycle.
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1.5.2. US fundamental news in calendar time
In this subsection we map the intuition in the previous subsection to fundamental data,
and show that earnings announced early in the reporting cycle indeed have lower correlation
with past earnings.
First, I need a measure of the previously mentioned “earnings" for a given month, and ideally without using return information: It would be the most helpful to explain the pattern
in stock returns without using stock returns. The measure I choose is aggregate return
on equity (ROE), which is aggregate quarterly earnings divided by aggregate book value
of equity on the universe of stocks that announce in a given month. Notice that aggregate earnings themselves are non-stationary, and need to be scaled by something. I follow
Vuolteenaho (2002) to use book value of equity, which could be thought of as a smoothed
earnings measure over a long look-back window. This is because of the “clean accounting
assumption," which holds reasonably well in reality (Campbell (2017)). This measure echoes
with the literature studying aggregate earnings (e.g. Ball et al. (2009), Patatoukas (2014),
Ball and Sadka (2015), Hann et al. (2020)), which shows that aggregate earnings convey
important information for the economy. Overall, ROE is a simple and reasonable manifestation of earnings, with which I can quantitatively illustrate the intuition in the previous
section.
Having picked the specific earnings measure, I construct this measure for each calendar
month among all the firms that announce in the month. Column 1 of Table 2.6 performs a
simple regression of aggregate ROE on the sum of aggregate ROE over the past months, and
the result is simple and easy to interpret: the coefficient is significantly positive, indicating
it is indeed reasonable for investors to extrapolate past earnings to forecast the future.
However, columns 2-3 show that there are important complications underneath this simple
result, which is that this extrapolation works substantially less well when the forecasted
month is newsy, and that it works much better when the forecasted month is non-newsy.
Column 4 demonstrates that this difference is statistically significant. Panel A performs the

18

regressions only on firms with fiscal quarters aligned with calendar quarters and also timely
reporting. This may lead to the concern that this does not represent the real experience of
investors, who observe all announcements of all firms. Panel B-D include these other firms
and show that the result is qualitatively similar.
What if the investors do not consider the complications in column 2-4, and use only the
simple and static results in column 1? In that case, when past earnings are good, you would
see negative surprises in upcoming newsy months; in the non-newsy months you would see
positive surprises. When forecasting earnings of these newsy months you overreacted in the
past; in forecasting these non-newsy month earnings you underreacted in the past.
Notice it is not quite accurate to simply say that people underreact to news in the newsy
months. If return continues over some horizons after the newsy months, one can characterize
investors’ initial reactions in the newsy months as underreactions. This indeed seems to be
the case if one look at horizons that are less than two months, but in the third month the
return reverses and the overall continuation weakens substantially. Besides, the main point
of this paper is the difference in the return serial correlations between newsy and non-newsy
months, not the sum.
It is more accurate to say that reactions to news in newsy months contain both under- and
overreactions. Specifically, reactions to news about future newsy months are overreactions,
and will be met with surprises in the opposite direction in future newsy months. On the
other hand, reactions to news about future non-newsy months are underreactions, and will
be met with surprises in the same direction in future non-newsy months. Notice this is
not a simple underreaction or overreaction story, but instead is a framework featuring one
mechanism of imperfect extrapolation, from which both under- and over-reaction arise.14
14

This is also distinctive from a story of correlation neglect, which states that the overreaction is in the
second months of the quarters. The distinction is carefully discussed in Appendix A. Evidence supporting
correlation neglect is documented in Table A.1.
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1.6. Stylized model
In this section I build a stylized model to formalized the intuition stated in earlier sections.
I present the simplest model that gets to the most important feature of the data which is
that newsy month returns are being more negatively predicted by past returns, relative to
the non-newsy month returns. A feature of the data that I leave out of the model is that
the newsy month returns themselves are responsible for positively and negatively predicting
future returns. I discuss how to modify the model to incorporate this feature at the end of
the section. The model is inspired by Guo and Wachter (2019). Consider an infinite-horizon
discrete-time economy with risk-neutral investors. Let Dt denote the aggregate dividend at
P
i
time t, and dt = log Dt . Define ∆dt = dt − bt−1 = dt − (1 − ρ)( ∞
i=0 ρ dt−1−i ). Here, bt−1
is an exponentially weighted moving average of past dividends. Assuming a stable payout
ratio, dividend and earnings will be tightly related. bt−1 then resembles a scaled version
of book value of equity, which is an accumulation of past retained earnings. The measure
∆dt then mimics the ROE measure that I used in my previous analyses. While the relation
is not exact and involves major simplifying assumptions, this setup does lead to a simple,
closed-form solution. I choose this setup to balance the simplicity in the model and the
connection with my empirical analyses.15
Consider investors in month t − j who have just observed ∆dt−j . They, being reasonably
extrapolative, make an adjustment of mδ j+1 ∆dt−j on their forecast of ∆dt+1 . Here m
represents the degree of extrapolation, and δ j+1 the decay over time. Then, assuming the
changes made in each month are additive, it follows that investors’ forecast for ∆dt+1 is
15
A simpler way to model this is to let ∆dt = dt − dt−1 , or period over period dividend growth. This
is in fact a special case of my setup where ρ equals 0. It leads to an even simpler model with fewer state
variables, and conveys very similar intuitions. The measure is however different from what I use in the
empirical section. Another way of modeling this is to literally model book value of equity as the sum of past
retained earnings. This approach does not lead to closed-form solutions.
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m

P∞

j=0 δ

j ∆d
t−j

at the end of month t. Formally, let the investors believe:

∆dt+1

= m

∞
X

δ j ∆dt−j + ut+1

(1.1)

j=0
iid

∼ N (0, σu ),

ut

∀t

(1.2)

δ j ∆dt+i−1−j + ut+i

(1.3)

And more generally, for all i ≥ 1:

∆dt+i

= m

∞
X
j=0

ut

iid

∼ N (0, σu ),

∀t

(1.4)

In other words, investors extrapolate an exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) of
past cash flow growth. The decay parameter in the EWMA δ and the degree of extrapolation
P∞ j
m lie between 0 and 1. Denote xt =
j=0 δ ∆dt−j , so that investors expect ∆dt+1 =
mxt + ut+1 . Notice xt+1 can be recursively written as:

xt+1 = ∆dt+1 + δxt

(1.5)

This recursive relation does not involve the investors’ beliefs yet. Now given the investors’
beliefs of future cash flow growth, it follows that they believe the following process of x
going forward:

xt+1 = ∆dt+1 + δxt

(1.6)

= mxt + ut+1 + δxt

(1.7)

= (m + δ)xt + ut+1

(1.8)

A similar relation applies beyond period t + 1. Notice m + δ needs to be less than 1 for the
process of xt to be stationary in the investors’ minds.
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While the investors use a constant extrapolation parameter m in their beliefs, in reality the
process is driven by a dynamic parameter that takes values h and l in alternating periods,
where l < m < h:
∆dt+1 =



 hxt + ut+1 , where t is even

 lxt + ut+1 , where t is odd

This reduced-form setup maps to the empirical ROE dynamics described in previous sections.
While such dynamics are caused by heterogeneity in reporting lag among firms that share a
persistent time component in earnings, I do not model this particular mechanism.16 Given
this cash flow process in reality, xt+1 actually follows the process:

xt+1 = δxt + ∆dt+1 =



 (h + δ)xt + ut+1 , where t is even

 (l + δ)xt + ut+1 , where t is odd

Having set up the investors’ beliefs and how they deviate from reality, I now compute the
equilibrium valuation ratio, which requires solely the beliefs, and the equilibrium equity
returns, which require both the beliefs and the reality. Denote the current dividend on the
aggregate market Dt . Let Pnt be the price of an equity strip that expires n periods away.
Define:
Fn (xt ) =

Pnt
Dt

(1.9)

We now show that Fn (xt ) is indeed a function of xt , our state variable representing past
cash flow growth. Notice Fn (xt ) must satisfy the following recursive relation:

Fn (xt ) = Et [rFn−1 (xt+1 )

Dt+1
]
Dt

(1.10)

Where r is the time discounting parameter of the investors. Conjecture that Fn (xt ) =
16

In an alternative version of the model, I model the underlying quarterly earnings as a persistent process
and monthly earnings as quarterly earnings broken with randomness. This more realistic approach delivers
similar intuition as my baseline model, but not closed-from solution.
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ean +bn xt +cn ∆dt . Notice the relation dt+1 − dt = ∆dt+1 − ρ∆dt . This is key to a simple
solution in closed form. Substitute the conjecture back into equation 1.10 and take the log
of both sides:
1
an +bn xt +cn ∆dt = log r+an−1 +(bn−1 (m+δ)+(cn−1 +1)m)xt −ρ∆dt + (bn−1 +cn−1 +1)2 σu2
2
(1.11)
Which leads to the following recursive relation for an , bn , and cn :
1
an = an−1 + log r + (bn−1 + cn−1 + 1)2 σu2
2

(1.12)

bn = bn−1 (m + δ) + m(1 + cn−1 )

(1.13)

cn = −ρ

(1.14)

Notice equation 1.14 along with the boundary condition of b0 = 0 implies the solution:

bn =

1 − (m + δ)n
m(1 − ρ)
1−m−δ

(1.15)

And an can be pinned down accordingly. Notice the sequence of bn is a positive, increasing
sequence that approach a potentially large limit

m(1−ρ)
1−m−δ .

Intuitively speaking, when xt is

high, dividends growth is expected to be high in the future, and therefore current valuation
is high.17
Having solved for the valuation ratios of an equity strip that expires n periods away, we
bring in the actual cash flow process to compute its return Rn,t+1 . For even t, notice the
17

The loading on ∆dt is −ρ because there is a reversal effect, which can be understood by considering
the extreme case of ρ = 1. In that case, ∆dt equals dt , and this means that investors expect the level of
the dividend to mean revert. Hence high dividend implies low dividend growth in the future, and thereby
leads to low current valuation. Notice the loading −ρ does not change with n and the coefficients bn can
eventually have a much larger effect.
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log return needs to follow:

log(1 + Rn,t+1 ) = log(

Fn−1 (xt+1 ) Dt+1
)
Fn (xt )
Dt

= an−1 − an + bn−1 xt+1 − bn xt + cn−1 ∆dt+1 − cn ∆dt
+∆dt+1 − ρ∆dt
= an−1 − an + bn−1 ((h + δ)xt + ut+1 ) − bn xt + (cn−1 + 1)(hxt + ut+1 )
= an−1 − an + (h − m)(bn−1 + (1 − ρ))xt + (bn−1 + (1 − ρ))ut+1

Similarly, for odd t, we have:

log(1 + Rn,t+1 ) = an−1 − an + (l − m)(bn−1 + (1 − ρ))xt + (bn−1 + (1 − ρ))ut+1

Two points are worth noting: First, in returns there is an unpredictable component (bn−1 +
(1 − ρ))ut+1 that is completely driven by the unpredictable component in cash flow growth.
Cash flow growth therefore correlates positively with contemporaneous returns. Since returns are largely unpredictable, this component accounts for most of their variation. Second,
there is a predictable component that takes alternate signs. Hence, in the months where cash
flow growth has high/low correlation with past growth, as represented by xt , past cash flow
growth positively/negatively forecasts the return. Given the contemporaneous correlation
between return and cash flow growth, past returns would also positively/negatively forecast
current return in the high/low correlation months.
Notice that this simple model has a few counterfactual aspects. First, it predicts that returns
and cash flow surprises are very highly correlated. In the data they are only weakly positively
correlated. This is because investors extrapolate the entirety of ∆dt , which then feeds into
xt and drives valuation and return. A more realistic framework would feature investors who
understand that part of the realized cash flow is purely transitory and correctly leave them
out of the state variable xt . I write down such a model in Appendix B.1.
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Second, the baseline model predicts that all past returns—whether they are newsy month
returns or not—negatively predict future newsy month returns and positively predict nonnewsy month returns. In the data this distinction is much stronger when past newsy month
returns are used to forecast future returns. Notice in Table 2.3 and 2.4 only the newsy
month returns are used on the right-hand-side of the regressions. This feature can be
incorporated by letting the ∆dt in the l realization periods go into xt with higher weights.
The economic meaning of this modification is that investors perform especially intensive
expectation formation in earnings seasons. While this may be an intuitive premise, it is
a feature that does not arise naturally from the model but rather needs to be added. A
version of this model that incorporates this feature is written down in Appendix B.2.

1.7. Additional tests
1.7.1. First week of the quarter and first quarter of the year
In this subsection I present further evidence on the relation between the predictability pattern of aggregate market returns and the earnings reporting cycle.
First, in my previous analysis I focused on monthly stock returns, and therefore used the
concept of newsy months. However, the period of intensive earnings reporting, or the earnings season, does not start immediately on the first day of the newsy months. In fact,
among firms with fiscal periods aligned with calendar quarters, only 0.27% of their earnings
announcements occur within the first week (more precisely, the first 5 trading days) of the
quarter. This is an order of magnitude lower than what an average week contains, which is
about 8% of the announcements. In contrast, the second week in each quarter sees 2.93%
of the announcements, which is on the same order of magnitude as an average week. The
reversal of market returns—if indeed arising from these earnings announcements—should
not exist in the first week of the newsy months.
The left panel of Table 2.7 shows that this prediction is exactly true. While we have seen
that past newsy month returns negatively predicts the next newsy month return (reproduced
in column 1), the coefficient is close to zero in the first week of a newsy month. This weak
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coefficient is shown in column 2. Consequently, excluding the first week of the newsy months
makes the reversal effect even stronger, as is in column 3.
The right panel of Table 2.7 shows that analogous patterns exist in other countries according
to their own earnings seasons. For each country, I determine the pre-season period in the first
months of the quarters by calculating the 0.5 percentile value of the reporting lag for that
country. This value is then rounded down to the closet trading week to arrive at the length
of the pre-season. For US, because the reporting is fast, this value converts to one trading
week, which is the length used in the US analysis above. For the other countries reporting
is slower, and the pre-season periods are often longer, ranging from 1 to 3 weeks. Column 5
shows that the market returns of these countries also do not reverse in their corresponding
pre-season periods. In contrast, column 6 shows that the reversal is quite strong immediately
outside these pre-season periods. This foreshadows the reversal arm of my global sample
results, which I will demonstrate in more details in Section 1.7.3. Overall, Table 2.7 shows
that the dynamic serial predictive relation in stock returns is indeed tied to the earnings
seasons. This piece of evidence speaks in favor of stories involving these earnings reporting
cycles and against those built upon other unrelated quarterly fluctuations.
In addition to the first week of each quarter, in the first quarter of each year we may also
expect a weaker pattern of dynamic serial correlation of returns. The reasons are twofolded. First, in Q1 earnings reporting is substantially slower. The median reporting lag
in the first quarter of the US is 41 days, while that for the other 3 quarters is 30 days.
This is because firms need to additionally conduct 10-K filing in Q1, which takes resources
that could otherwise be used for earnings announcements. Hence, January is less newsy
than the other 3 newsy months. Second, in Q1 there are widespread tax related trading,
which can potentially add unrelated movements to aggregate returns. Both reasons can lead
to a weaker effect in Q1 than in the other 3 quarters. Table 2.8 shows that this is true.
Comparing column 1-3 to 4-6, we see that in Q1 both the positive and negative arms of
return predictability are weaker.
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1.7.2. Evidence from survey data
In this subsection I test my theory with survey data from IBES. In the model, investors
overreact when predicting earnings in the upcoming newsy months, and underreact when
predicting those in the upcoming non-newsy months. It therefore has a key prediction,
which is that past earnings surprises positively predict surprises in the upcoming non-newsy
months, and negatively predict those in the upcoming newsy months.
To test this prediction, I use EPS estimates from IBES Detail History. IBES Summary History conveniently provides firm level consensus estimates, which are IBES’s flagship product.
However, it cannot be used in this particular case because these consensuses are struck in
the middle of the month per Thomson Reuters’ production cycle.18 Since I use calendar
month returns, I compute analogous consensus estimates at month ends, so that earnings
surprises in a given calendar month can be measured relative to them.19
At the end of each month, each firm’s consensus EPS estimate for a given fiscal period
is computed as the median of the estimates that are issued in the past 180 days relative
to the forecast date. For each analyst, only the most recent estimate is included in this
calculation. This horizon is chosen to reflect the methodology with which the IBES consensus
is computed.20 The results of the analysis are qualitatively the same with a wide range of
look-back windows.
A firm’s earnings surprise in the announcing month is the announced earnings per share
subtract its consensus forecast at the end of the previous month, and then divide by its
stock price at the previous month end. I am adopting price as the scaling variable as
opposed to book value per share to align with the standard practice in the literature that
studies earnings surprises (e.g. Hartzmark and Shue (2018)). The results are very similar if
I instead use book value of equity per share. For each earnings announcement that occurs in
18

Specifically the Thursday before the third Friday of every month.
Incidentally, the most frequently cited issue with IBES Summary—the practice of crude rounding combined with splits (Payne and Thomas (2003))—is not necessarily a grave concern for our purpose as we are
looking at the aggregate data, and rounding errors cancel with each other if aggregated across many firms.
20
This is according to the user manual of IBES.
19
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month t, I aggregate their surprise measures with market cap weight to form the aggregate
earnings surprise in month t, or Supt . I then run time-series predictive auto-regressions on
Supt , and importantly, I separate the sample by whether the dependent variable is a newsy
month, and examine whether the predictive coefficients differ in the two sub-samples.
Table 2.9 shows that we indeed observe a significantly lower predictive coefficient when the
dependent variable is newsy. Column 1 shows that past surprises strongly positively predict
the eventual aggregate earnings surprise on average. Column 2 shows that this predictive
relation is less positive in the newsy months. Column 3 shows that it is much stronger in
the non-newsy months. Column 4 shows that this difference between newsy and non-newsy
months is statistically significant. Column 5 shows that this difference is especially strong if
we use surprises in newsy months in the past to predict future aggregate earnings surprises.
These significant differences are consistent with the key prediction of the model.
However, if the model is taken to be a literal model of survey data, we should not just expect
a substantially weaker coefficient in column 2—we should see a negative coefficient, like in the
regressions with aggregate market returns. We do not see this negative coefficient, because
the overall underreaction among the analysts, reflected by a strongly positive coefficient in
column 1, is an aspect that does not translate into market returns—the aggregate market
returns in the US are only very weakly positively autocorrelated overall. This discrepancy
suggests that the latency in the survey expectations is not completely present in the actual
expectations of the market, and it is the latter that I model. A more realistic representation
of survey expectation is perhaps an average between the timely market expectation and
a smoothed measure of past expectations. In the wake of this modification, my model
would generate this overall underreaction in the survey data. It would still predict that this
underreaction is weaker in the newsy month, and Table 2.9 shows that this key prediction
holds true.
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1.7.3. Cross sectional analysis
US cross section of industries
The main intuition behind the theory is the follows: if a group of stocks are 1) tightly and
obviously connected in fundamentals, so that investors actively learn one stock’s information
from other another stock’s announcement and 2) sizable in number, so that the group as a
whole reports progressively along the earnings reporting cycle, then earnings announced in
the newsy months will correlate much less strongly with past news, compared to earnings
announced in the non-newsy months. Failure to see this time-varying serial correlation
structure of earnings will lead to the dynamic return predictability pattern shown above.
While it is very natural to apply this story first to all stocks in the US economy, it should
additionally apply to the cross section of industry-level stock returns. Two random stocks in
each industry of a country are more connected with each other than two random stocks drawn
from the same country. An industry is therefore a smaller economy except better connected.
As discussed in Section 1.1, extensive intra-industry information transfer during earnings
announcements is well documented by the accounting literature (e.g. Foster (1981)). In this
section, I test whether industry excess returns, or industry returns subtracting the aggregate
market returns, exhibit a dynamic serial predictive relation similar to that in the aggregate
market returns.
Table 2.10 shows the regression results of industry excess returns on past newsy month
industry excess returns. While the structure of this table looks similar to that of Table
2.3, it differs in two aspects: First, Table 2.10 is on an industry-month panel instead of
a monthly time series. Second, Table 2.10 uses industry excess returns as opposed to the
aggregate market returns. What is used in Table 2.3 is what is being subtracted from the
dependent and independent variables in Table 2.10.
Stocks data are taken from CRSP. In each cross section, I drop the small stocks, defined
as those with market cap below the 10th percentile of the NYSE universe. Industry-level
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returns are market cap-weighted averages. All regressions in Table 2.10 require that there be
at least 20 stocks in the industry-month. This filter is applied because the theory requires
a sizable group of stocks to be in an industry. I use the stock’s issuing company’s four-digit
SIC code as the industry classification variable, and drop observations with a missing SIC
code, or a code of 9910, 9990, and 9999, which represent unclassified. The empirical results
remain significant if smaller cutoffs are chosen, even though they become weaker. This is
discussed later in the section.
Column 1 shows that within a look-back window of about a year, or the first four lags,
the cross section of industry stock returns exhibits positive price momentum on average.
This contrasts the tenuous momentum effect found on the US aggregate market. Similar to
the results on the aggregate market, this momentum effect is entirely concentrated in the
non-newsy months, and even flips sign in the newsy months. This is shown in columns 2
and 3. Column 4 shows the difference between the coefficients in the newsy months and
non-newsy months, and they are overall negative within four lags, as predicted.
While the four-digit SIC code is a commonly used, natural industry classification variable,
the first two and three digits represent less granular “industry” classification, known as “major
group” and “industry group”. Table 2.11 examines whether the return predictability pattern
is robust to the choice of the industry classification variable. Here I switch to the sum of
the first four lags, as before. Across Panel A to C, the serial predictive relation of industry
excess returns is strongly different across newsy and non-newsy months. Hence, this pattern
is not sensitive to the specific level of the industry classification. Unless otherwise noted, I
use the four-digit SIC code to represent industries.
Analogous to what is done in the time series section, Table 2.12 additionally verifies this timevarying predictive relation of industry level excess ROE with a monthly panel regression.
As before, we see that past earnings predict future newsy month earnings significantly less
well, compared to future non-newsy month earnings. This difference appears statistically
stronger than the time-series one in Table 2.6, likely due to the large number of industries
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that provide richer variations in earnings and substantially more observations.
Cross sectional variation across industries provides us with an interesting testing ground of
our proposed theory. At the beginning of the section, I mentioned that my story applies
to groups of stocks that are sizable in number, and are tightly connected in fundamentals.
These lead to testable predictions, which are examined by Table 2.13. Column 1 and 2 run
this test on directly measured cash flow connectivity. I compute covariance of normalized
excess ROE for each pair of stocks in the same industry-quarter, compute the within industry
average (weighted by the geometric average of the market capitalization of the pair of stocks),
and then take the trailing four quarter average for each industry. Each cross section is
then split between high connectivity industries and low connectivity ones. Column 1 and
2 show that the dynamic return predictability pattern in industry level excess returns is
indeed stronger on the highly connected industries, and weak on the low connectivity ones.
Chen et al. (2020a) documented a financial contagion effect that leads to large cash flow
comovements within industries. They documented that such effect is larger on industries
that 1) have higher entry barrier and 2) are more balanced between financially strong and
weak firms. Column 3-6 run the tests on the corresponding subsamples, and found that the
effect is indeed stronger on the more balanced and the harder-to-enter industries. The last
two columns run the regression separately on industries with a smaller and a larger number
of constituents. They show that the effect is larger on those larger industries, as predicted.
Table 2.14 further demonstrates the importance of connected fundamentals by conducting
placebo tests on superficial and fake “industries”, where no such connection exists. Column
1 performs the regression on an industry consisting of stocks with SIC codes of 9910, 9990,
9999, and missing values, which all represent unclassified. Despite the shared SIC code
values, the stocks are not actually similar to each others. Here, we see no effect, as expected.
Column 2 assigns stocks to “industries” based on randomly generated “SIC codes”. Here we
again see no effect, unsurprisingly.
A potential confounding effect to heterogeneity analyses of return predictability in general
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is that return predictability is naturally more concentrated on “inefficient” stocks and industries, such as those with low market capitalization, price, and volume, because it is harder
for arbitrageurs to take advantage of return predictability on these stocks. While there is no
consensus on how this notion of inefficiency should be measured, market capitalization is a
good place to start. It is worth noting that among the sorting variables I use, within industry cash flow connectivity and balance are not obviously related to industry capitalization.
Entry cost and number of industry constituents are in fact positively related to industry capitalization, and the inefficiency story alone predicts smaller effects on the harder-to-enter
and the larger industries, which is the opposite of what my theory predicts and the opposite
of what the data shows. The tests run in Table 2.13 are sharp tests, in that the predicted
empirical pattern is unlikely to rise from this other effect of heterogeneous “inefficiency”.
Throughout the paper, I have been using the notions of ‘newsy’ and ‘non-newsy’ months,
which reflect a binary approach. In Section 1.7.1, we saw that this binary approach is
sometimes insufficient. Specifically, in the first quarter the reporting is substantially slower,
and consequently January is less newsy than the April, July, and October. I then showed that
the reversal in January and the continuation in February and March are less strong, and this
is consistent with the notion that January is less newsy and February and March are newsier.
This illustrates the potential usefulness of a quantitative measure of ‘newsyness’, according
to which one can form testable predictions like this in a more general and systematic way.
The major source of time series variation in newsyness is the Q1 effect, which is already explored in Table 2.8.21 However, the cross industry setting provides interesting heterogeneity
in 1) reporting lags and 2) fiscal period end time. Concretely, if an industry consistently
reports slowly, then for that industry, the first months of the quarters should be less newsy,
and the second and third months newsier. If an industry has a sizable fraction of the firms
ending their fiscal quarter with the first month of each quarter, then for that industry the
21
Another thing is the earnings announcements have become a few days slower in the last two decades,
potentially due to the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002. The change is too small to have an appreciable effect in
my later analyses. The sample is also not quite long enough to establish a clear effect.
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second months of the quarters can potentially contain more announcers with fresh news, and
hence become newsier. Below, I develop a method to quantify the newsyness of a month
and then run tests on the constructed measures.
I model the unit newsyness of each earnings announcement as exponentially declining in reporting lag, with various half-lives. Specifically, let the lag be x days, then unit_newsy(x) =
x

0.5 HL , where HL is the half-life parameter. For each month-reporting lag, I compute the
product of this unit newsyness measure and the percentage of earnings announcements with
this lag, which is the number of earnings announcements with the lag, divided by the total
number of announcements this quarter. I then aggregate the product to the month level.
Overall, if a month contains announcements with shorter reporting lags, it will be newsier.
If a month contains more earnings announcements, it will be newsier. Lastly, I rescale to
sum to 1 per quarter, and average historical newsyness to the month of the year level. In
doing so, I use only data available in real time. Specifically, I use the expanding window
averages.
To illustrate the effect of the half life parameter, Table 2.15 tablulates the Q2 newsyness
on the US aggregate economy for the last cross section, i.e. it uses all historical data.
From the left to right, the half life in the measure increases from one day to sixty days.
When the half life is small, the newsyness vector is effectively (1, 0, 0), which is my original
binary approach which sets April as newsy and May/June as non-newsy. As the half life
increases, the vector becomes closer to (0.5, 0.5, 0), which is roughly the fractions of earnings
announcements within those months. This is because that as the half-life increases, early
and late announcers are being weighted increasingly equally.
Previously, I run the regression exreti,t = α+β1

P4

P4

j=1 exreti,nm(t,j) +β2 (

j=1 exreti,nm(t,j) ×

Itnm ) + β3 Itnm + ϵi,t . Here exreti,t is the value weighted return of industry i in month t in
excess of the market. exreti,nm(t,j) is the value weighted average excess return of industry i
in the jth newsy month before month t. Importantly, Itnm is a dummy variable indicating
whether month t is newsy. I incorporate the said quantitative measure in this regression in
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two ways. First, I replace Itnm with the quantitative newsyness measure N ewt . A newsyness
value of 1 predicts strong reversal as before, while a moderate value of 0.8 predicts weaker
P
reversal in month t. Second, I replace 4j=1 exreti,nm(t,j) , which is the sum of the previous
P12
four newsy months, with exret12nw
i,t =
j=1 exreti,t−j ·N ewi,t−j , which is a weighted average
of past 12 monthly excess return of industry i, with newsier months carrying higher weights.
Panel A of Table 2.16 shows the results with half lives of 3, 4, and 5 days. The effect is
strong under a wider range of half lives, but these are roughly where the effect is the most
pronounced. It is worth noting that these half lives are kept the same across industries to
enforce discipline in this exercise and avoid excessive data mining. These half lives will also
be used in exercises across countries and country-industries. Overall, we see that both the
continuation term and the reversal term are stronger than under the binary specification.22
This exercise is not only a way to obtain higher statistical power, but also a meaningful
auxiliary test that takes advantage of the heterogeneity across industries.
Global aggregate markets
Global earnings reporting cycle Having described the results in the US, we move to the
global data. In addition to new data on stock returns, other countries have different earnings
reporting cycles from the US and therefore can potentially provide meaningful out-of-sample
tests of the theory. At least two sources of variations in the earnings reporting cycles appear
of interest. First, variation in reporting frequency, specifically, a number of major countries
require firms to report semi-annually instead of quarterly. Second, variation in reporting
lag, specifically, all major countries report substantially slowlier than the US.
To look into the variations, I collect interim earnings announcement date, earnings, and
book value of equity from Worldscope. Even though this data source has substantially
better coverage of interim accounting data than Compustat Global, the data start only in
22

Since it is important that we do not invoke look-ahead bias in our quantitative newsyness measure,
the exercise is done on the post-1973 sample, where the earnings announcement dates are available. The
improvement is clear in spite of the smaller, post-1973 sample, where industry momentum is in fact a little
weaker overall. This is possible because after 1973 we still have about 50 years of data, and the effect of
correctly setting the newsyness for each month across different industries greatly outweighs the effect of a
smaller sample.
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1990s, and the coverage does not stabilize until 1998. This is substantially shorter history
relative to the quarterly accounting data in the US, where stable coverage begins in 1971.
Perhaps this is in part why studies on the US market is more abundant. I nonetheless draw
lessons from this international dataset, as some patterns can be sufficiently clear even on a
short sample of 20 years.
In terms of the variation in reporting frequency, a country level tabulation exercise on
fiscal periods’ end months reveals that in those countries requiring semi-annual reporting,
comparable numbers of firms have Mar/Sep and Jun/Dec fiscal periods end. Hence, the
entire country still operates on a quarterly calendar, and first months of each quarters are
still the earliest time for the freshest news to come out. The theory therefore applies to
those countries as well.23
Regarding the variation in reporting lags, first, the right panel of Table 2.1 shows that the
fiscal quarters are also well aligned with the calendar quarters in the global sample. Hence,
news in group 1 months remains the freshest in the global data. However, the reporting
intensity is very different and can be used to generate some heterogeneity in the right-handside variables in the global analysis. Table 2.17 shows that relative to the US, a much smaller
fraction of the firms announce in the group 1 months in the global sample. In contrast, group
2 months contain the largest fraction of announcing firms—about 60%. Globally, it seems
that both group 1 and group 2 months are viable candidates for newsy months, as the
former provide the freshest news and the latter come with the most intensive reporting.
Group 3 months, however, do not fall in either category. In fact, the average reporting lag
in the US is 37 days, which is a little longer than one month; that for the international
sample is 55 days, which is about two months.24 In other words, globally group 1 combined
with group 2 months roughly constitute the first half of the earnings reporting cycles. To
23

The only exception here is Australia, where Jun/Dec fiscal periods are overwhelmingly more common.
However, overall country level momentum is weak in Australia, and it is hard to say that the small reversal
we see in Jan/Feb and Jul/Aug is lending support to my theory. I nonetheless keep the country in my
sample, since there is still a non-trivial portion of firms with Mar/Sep fiscal periods.
24
Both numbers exclude cases where the lag exceeds 182 days. These cases have heightened probability
of data errors. They are rare anyway.
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enforce consistency across the US and the global analysis, I set the newsy “months” to be
the combined periods of group 1 and group 2 months in the global data. For example, April
and May combined is considered to be a newsy ‘month’ in the global data.25
It is important to note while the practice of setting ‘newsy’ months based on aggregate
data is similar to what I did in the US, doing so on the global sample involves a stronger
assumption. In both the US and the global sample, the return data start substantially
earlier than the accounting data from which the newsy months are inferred. However, the
history of accounting data is much longer in the US, and it can be seen that over the course
of this longer history the aggregate reporting cycle remained stable, and in fact was a few
days faster in the earlier decades. Also, it is clearly documented that quarterly reporting
has been present in the US even years before 1926 thanks to the requirements of the NYSE
(Kraft et al. (2017)). Outside the US similar evidence is less easy to find systematically in
one place,26 even though country-by-country research clearly shows that regular financial
reporting has been on going decades before the inception of the Worldscope data, at least
for financially developed nations like UK, Japan, France, and Australia.
Given these contexts, while I still use return data before 1990s in my global tests, I focus
on the financially developed countries, where financial regulation is sounder and has longer
history. The list of developed markets that I use follows that in Asness et al. (2019) and
consists of the developed markets classified by Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI).
Also, on this long sample of returns I only use the simplest and most obvious message from
the global earnings announcement data, specifically which months are the newsy months.
Analyses that take advantage of finer variations in the earnings reporting cycles across
countries are done on the post-1998 sample, and are implemented so that the independent
25
Finland is the only country other than the US to have an average reporting lag of less than 6 weeks.
Setting group 2 months as non-newsy for Finland and newsy for all other non-US countries indeed leads
to slightly stronger results, but since this logic turns on for only one country it is too sparse a source of
variation. For the sake of simplicity I do not do this in my baseline analyses. Rather, I more thoroughly
utilize the variation in reporting lags across countries in the form of quantitative newsyness in later analyses.
26
It is very easy to find each country’s current reporting convention, but that can be seen in the accounting
data anyway.
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variable does not incur any look-ahead bias, similar to what was done for the US industries.
Even with these practices, one should perhaps place more focus the post-war and the post1974 results for the global sample, and interpret the pre-1974 results with more caution.
Global fundamental news On the global panel of countries, analysis of the earnings
predictability supports the newsy status of group 2 months in the global data. Table 2.18
does similar regressions to those in Table 2.6, except it is now at a country-month level.
Because an average country has much smaller sample size than the US, the country-month
level ROE is winsorized at the 10th and the 90th percentiles of each cross section to limit
the impacts of the outliers caused by low aggregate book values of equity.27 The regressions
are weighted by aggregate book value of equity of the country-month divided by the total
book value of the year. This regression weight mimics that in Hartzmark and Shue (2018).
It overweights large country-months and at the same time does not mechanically overweight
more recent cross sections. Overall, Table 2.18 shows similar results to those in Table 2.6,
which is past earnings predicts future earnings substantially less well in the newsy months,
which are now first and the second months of each quarters. The results are again robust to
the inclusion of firms that have fiscal quarters unaligned with calendar quarters and those
reporting late.
Return predictability Having described the earnings-related information globally, I move
to the return predictability results. My country-level market returns come from Global
Financial Data (GFD). Returns are all in US dollar. A number of return series go back
further than 1926, but in this analysis I cut the sample at 1926 to be consistent with the
US results.28 Of course, if the data for a certain country do not go back further than 1926,
the truncation is not operative for that country.
27
These rather deep winsorization bounds are necessitated by the small cross sections early in the sample:
those are precisely where the raw ROE values are extreme (due to small number of stocks in the aggregation),
and the cross section sizes are less than 20 countries—which means winsorzation at the 5th and 95th
percentiles makes no difference.
28
After deleting some obviously problematic data in the UK in the 1600s and 1700s, inclusion of those
early samples makes the results stronger.
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To start, Table 2.19 runs analogous regressions as those in Table 2.4, except they are now
on a panel of country level aggregate returns, and that the newsy months now include both
the first and the second months of each calendar quarter. In column 1, we observe an
unconditional momentum effect. This reflects country-level momentum in Moskowitz et al.
(2012), which is in fact stronger in more recent periods. Columns 2 and 3 then show that
this component is much stronger in the non-newsy months, here meaning the third months
of the quarters. The results are robust in the post-war and the post-1974 sample. The result
is very weak in the first half of the sample, however, perhaps reflecting the smaller sample
size before 1974.
Since aggregate returns in other countries are going to be positively related to the US
market return contemporaneously, to observe the additional effect more cleanly, I remove
each country’s loading on the US market return according to their US return betas. I
estimate the betas on a rolling 24 month basis up to one month before the dependent
variable month, so that the beta does not contain any look-ahead bias, and the dependent
variable corresponds to positions implementable in real time. The results are in Table 2.20,
and they convey similar messages as those in Table 2.19.
In panel B of Table 2.16, I conduct an exercise involving quantitative newsyness, as in the
cross section of US industries. Here the analysis starts only in 2000, which leads to a very
small sample size. On this small sample, we do observe marginally significant results, and
somewhat larger effect. However, because of the small sample size one needs to interpret
these results with caution.
Global cross sections of industries
Similar to the analyses for the US, I look at the cross sections of country-industry returns
in excess of the corresponding country-level returns. Returns are mostly taken from Compustat Global, augmented with the Canadian stocks from Compustat North America. To
be consistent with the global aggregate market results, I constrain the sample to the same
list of countries in the previous section. Returns are winsorized at the 0.5 and the 99.5
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percentiles each cross section to limit the impact of absurdly large values which are likely
erroneous.29 All returns are in USD. In each country-month, 10% of the smallest stocks
are dropped, after which the returns are aggregated to the industry and market level using
market cap weight. The difference of those two returns are then taken to arrive at the excess
returns that I use. Here, I again require each country-industry to have at least 20 stocks,
consistent with the rest of the paper.
Table 2.22 shows similar patterns to those found in Table 2.11: Country-industries exhibit
momentum only in the non-newsy months. The results do not seem to be sensitive to the
particular choice of industry variable. Table 2.21 is the companion results from earnings.
It again demonstrates the strong variation in earnings’ correlation with the past earnings.
Like those in the US, the cross sectional piece of the earnings regression produce statistically
stronger difference than the time series piece. Despite the very short sample that start in
1998, the difference is quite significantly established, thanks to the large number of industries
that provides rich cross sectional variation in the data.
In panel C of Table 2.16, I again conduct an exercise involving quantitative newsyness as
before. Here the analysis again starts only in 2000, which again leads to a small sample size,
even though the cross sections of industries help to improve things relative to the analyses
on global market excess returns. We observe improvements and results significant at the
traditional level. Because of the small sample size we again need to interpret these results
with caution.

1.8. Alternative explanations
Firms endogenously changing their reporting latency A large literature in accounting examines the relation between the timing of firms’ earnings announcements and the
news they convey. A clear empirical pattern that emerges is that early announcers tend to
announce better news than late announcers (e.g. Kross (1981), Kross and Schroeder (1984),
29

This step may appear non-standard from the perspective of the US sample, but the reason is that
CRSP’s pricing data quality is unusually good. On a global sample the winsorization step or operations that
achieve similar ends are unavoidable. See, for instance, Jensen et al. (2021)
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Chambers and Penman (1984), Johnson and So (2018b), Noh et al. (2021)). The literature
has also extensively studied the reasons behind this pattern, and has partially attributed it
to firms’ endogenous choices of reporting lag. For instance, deHaan et al. (2015) argue that
firms delay earnings announcements with bad results to avoid the early portion of the earnings reporting cycle which receives heightened attention. Givoly and Palmon (1982) argue
that they do so to buy time so that they can manipulate their accounting results.
However, it is not clear how this empirical regularity alone speaks to my results. Overall,
they imply that early announcers announce better results than late announcers. If investors
fail to anticipate that, then early announcers will have higher earnings surprises and higher
announcement excess returns. It is not clear why it would cause the market return early
in the announcement cycle to positively correlate with that late in the earnings reporting
cycle. If anything, exogenous variation in the intensity of this self-selection effect seems to
lead to a negative correlation of early announcement returns and late announcement returns
within quarter, as bad announcers being moved out of the newsy months makes the newsy
months look better and the subsequent non-newsy months look worse than they otherwise
would do. And even then it is not clear why this return predictability pattern would extend
across quarters.
Predictability reflecting predictable resolution of risks The most important set of
explanations for return predictability come from predictable resolution of risks, which leads
to high expected returns, as well as going through predictably low risk periods, which leads
to low expected returns. The type of variation in risks that is necessary to explain my time
series results is that after a good newsy month, the stock market is very risky in the upcoming
non-newsy months, and very safe in the upcoming newsy months. This requires the risk of
the market to vary at the monthly frequency. The variation needs to have a dependency up
to four quarters away, and it needs to have a mixture of positive and negative dependence
on the past, with the sign of the dependence going from positive to negative, and then back
to positive, and so on.

40

Standard asset pricing models such as habit, long-run risk, disaster, and intermediary-based
asset pricing all involve risks that should be fairly persistent at the monthly frequency. Even
if they do vary, it is unlikely that the variation would cause its dependency on the past to
take alternate signs across months. So it does not appear appropriate to use them to explain
my predictability pattern. A potentially more hopeful candidate is those exploring the risk
resolution that are associated with earnings announcements. Empirically, Savor and Wilson
(2016) show that early announcers earn higher excess returns than later announcers, which
is indeed consistent with the overall importance of the earnings season. This, however, does
not explain why current earnings season being good makes future earnings seasons safer and
future months out of earnings seasons riskier. The authors also show that stocks with high
past announcement return in excess of the market earn higher returns during their upcoming
announcement weeks than those with low past announcement excess returns. The authors
argue that this shows that the level of risks resolved by a given stock’s earnings announcement is persistent. The authors also show that earnings announcement dates are highly
stable, and therefore firms that have announced in January are likely to announce in April.
Combining these two pieces of information, it may seem that returns 3/6/9/12 months ago
might be influencing part of my cross sectional results. However, apart from the difference
in return frequency (monthly versus weekly) and cross sectional unit (industry/aggregate
versus stock), observe that the excess returns 3/6/9/12 months ago are used only when the
dependent variables are the newsy months, which is a sub-sample where the coefficient in
my regression is low, not high.
Loading on the seasonality effect My cross sectional results might seem related to those
in Heston and Sadka (2008) and Keloharju et al. (2016), who show that the full-year lags,
i.e., the 12, 24, 36, etc. monthly lags have unusually high predictive coefficients on stocklevel excess returns. Since their signals have no time-series variation (i.e. stock returns in
excess of the market have zero mean cross section by cross section), the results cannot be
related to my time-series results. However, could they explain my industry level results?
Full-year lags are indeed used in some of my regression results. Specifically, they are part
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of the RHS when the dependent variable are the group 1 months, like in column 2 of Table
2.10. However, observe that the point of my paper is that in group 1 months the return
predictive coefficients are unusually low, exactly the opposite of the points made in the
return seasonality literature. In other words, my results exist in spite of the loading on
return seasonality, not because of it.
Fluke driven by a small number of outliers One may worry that the time-series result
is driven by a handful of outliers, and is therefore not very robust. To mitigate this concern,
I perform the regression in Table 2.4 by decades, and report the results in Table 2.23. A
few things come out of this exercise. First, the pattern is very strong in the pre-1940 era,
which can already been inferred from the post-war column of Table 2.4. Second, in each and
every decade, the coefficient on the interacted term is negative and economically sizable.
This shows that the effect is in fact quite robust across time and not solely driven by short
episode like the pre-1940 era. Lastly, we see that this effect is by no means dwindling over
time. In fact, in recent decades the dynamic serial correlation pattern of the US market
return is stronger. This shows that this effect is not just a piece of history, but rather an
ongoing phenomenon.
Driven by look-ahead bias in estimated coefficient Past research has cast doubts
especially on the practicality of time-series strategies in the stock market. Specifically,
Goyal and Welch (2008) show that in forecasting future stock market returns, predictors
combined with expanding window coefficients extracted without look-ahead bias fail to outperform the expanding window mean of market returns. While Campbell and Thompson
(2008) quickly show that imposing some simple and reasonable constraints on the regression
estimation process will make the predictor-based approach clearly superior, it is nonetheless useful to make sure that the predictor in this paper can generate positive R2 without
involving coefficients estimated with look-ahead bias.
To investigate the R2 generated with no look-ahead bias coefficients, I extend the CRSP
aggregate market return series to 1871 using GFD data.
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I take valuation ratios data

from Robert Shiller’s website, and construct payout ratios and ROE series with data from
Amit Goyal’s website. These are used to generate the long-run return forecasts as in
Campbell and Thompson (2008). While the estimation sample go back to 1872, the R2
are evaluated starting from 1926, consistent with what is done in Campbell and Thompson
(2008).
The monthly R2 generated by various estimation methods are reported in Table 2.24. Coefficients are either constrained to be 1 or generated with simple expanding-window OLS
estimations. No shrinkage procedure is applied at all. In method 1, we see that even the
most naive method—combining signal with regression coefficients of returns on past signals
and a freely estimated constant—generates an R2 of 3.65%. This positive R2 along with
those generated with methods 2-7, should mitigate the concern that the strategy implied by
the time-series results in this paper could not have been profitably employed.
It is important to realize that section is about the implementation of the coefficient estimation procedure. It makes no statement on how much of these return predictability results
will continue to exist in the future. Recent works explicitly making those statements include
Mclean and Pontiff (2016) and Hou et al. (2018).

1.9. Conclusion
Contrary to prior beliefs, monthly stock market returns in the US can in fact be predicted
with past returns. Specifically, the U.S. stock market’s return during the first month of a
quarter correlates strongly with returns in future months, but the correlation is negative if
the future month is the first month of a quarter, and positive if it is not. I show that these first
months of a quarter are ‘newsy’ because they contain fresh earnings news, and argue that
the return predictability pattern arises because investors extrapolate these newsy month
earnings to predict future earnings, but did not recognize that earnings in future newsy
months are inherently less predictable. Survey data support this explanation, as does out-ofsample evidence across industries and international markets. This paper seriously challenge
the Efficient Market Hypothesis by documenting a strong and consistent form of return
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predictability. Behind this return predictability result is a novel mechanism of expectation
formation, which features fundamentals extrapolation with a representative parameter.
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CHAPTER 2
Tables and Figures
2.1. Tables
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Table 2.1

Company-fiscal period count by fiscal period end month
US

Global
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Count

Percent

Count

Percent

Group 1: Jan/Apr/Jul/Oct

78,747

8.85

56,951

5.74

Group 2: Feb/May/Aug/Nov

49,385

5.55

64,303

6.49

Group 3: Mar/Jun/Sep/Dec

761,310

85.59

870,263

87.77

Total

889,442

100.00

991,517

100.00

The table tabulates the number of company-quarter by 3 groups, where the groups are determined by the fiscal quarter end month,
specifically its remainder when divided by 3. First two columns contain count and percentage on the full sample of US companies.
The next two columns do the same tabulation on the full sample of global companies. For the US sample, data are quarterly from
1971 to 2021. For the global sample, data are quarterly and semi-annually from 1998 to 2021.

Table 2.2

US company-quarter count by reporting month
Both filters

Rpt Lag <= 92

Group 3 FQ end

No filter
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Count

Pct

Count

Pct

Count

Pct

Count

Pct

Group 1: Jan/Apr/Jul/Oct

345,986

46.47

375,787

43.24

357,265

46.93

387,466

43.56

Group 2: Feb/May/Aug/Nov

344,666

46.30

380,792

43.81

348,118

45.73

385,806

43.38

Group 3: Mar/Jun/Sep/Dec

53,830

7.23

112,594

12.95

55,927

7.35

116,170

13.06

Total

744,482

100.00

869,173

100.00

761,310

100.00

889,442

100.00

The table tabulates the number of company-quarter by 3 groups, where the groups are determined by the reporting month,
specifically its remainder when divided by 3. If a company reports earnings for a given fiscal quarter in October, this companyquarter belongs to group 1, as 10 ≡ 1 mod 3. First two columns contain count and percentage on the sample where 1) reporting
within 92 days and 2) aligned with calendar quarters. The next two columns do the same tabulation with only the first filter. The
next two columns apply only the second filter. The last two columns apply no filter. Data are quarterly from 1971 to 2021.

Table 2.3

Lead-lag relations of US monthly market returns
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

All

NM

Non-NM

Difference

0.090*

-0.168**

0.219***

-0.388***

[1.73]

[-2.32]

[3.92]

[-4.23]

0.014

-0.177***

0.109**

-0.287***

[0.34]

[-2.85]

[2.29]

[-3.66]

0.069

0.041

0.083**

-0.042

[1.55]

[0.44]

[2.07]

[-0.41]

0.027

-0.086

0.084**

-0.169**

[0.69]

[-1.26]

[2.09]

[-2.14]

0.007***

0.017***

0.002

0.015***

[3.40]

[4.77]

[0.86]

[3.53]

N

1,136

378

758

1,136

R-sq

0.013

0.064

0.072

0.070

mktnm(t,1)
mktnm(t,2)
mktnm(t,3)
mktnm(t,4)
const

Column 1 ofPthis table reports results from the following monthly time-series regression:
mktt = α + 4j=1 βj mktnm(t,j) + ϵt . Here mktt is the US aggregate market return in month
t, and mktnm(t,j) is the return in the jth newsy month (Jan, Apr, Jul, Oct) preceding month
t. Column 2 reports the same regression on the subsample where the dependent variable is
returns of the newsy months. Column 3 is for the non-newsy months. Column 4 reports
the differenceP
between the coefficients
P in column 2 and 3, extracted from this regression
mktt = α + 4j=1 βj mktnm(t,j) + 4j=1 γj mktnm(t,j) × Itnm + δItnm + ϵt , where Itnm is a
dummy variable taking the value of 1 when month t is newsy. Data are monthly from 1926
to 2021. T-statistics computed with White standard errors are reported in square brackets.
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Table 2.4

Lead-lag relations of US monthly market returns, across subsamples

P4

j=1 mktnm(t,j)

P4

j=1 mktnm(t,j)

×

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

All

NM

Non-NM

All

Post-WW2

First Half

Second Half

0.052**

-0.103***

0.129***

0.129***

0.082***

0.162***

0.090***

[2.04]

[-2.67]

[4.76]

[4.76]

[3.59]

[3.86]

[3.17]

-0.232***

-0.157***

-0.279***

-0.176***

[-4.93]

[-3.51]

[-3.96]

[-3.09]

0.016***

0.011***

0.019***

0.012**

[3.51]

[2.68]

[2.68]

[2.26]

Itnm

Itnm
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const

0.007***

0.017***

0.002

0.002

0.005**

-0.001

0.005

[3.30]

[4.60]

[0.74]

[0.74]

[2.16]

[-0.19]

[1.56]

N

1,136

378

758

1,136

893

567

569

R-sq

0.008

0.029

0.057

0.047

0.026

0.061

0.032
P4

Column 1 of this table reports results from the following monthly time-series regression: mktt = α + β j=1 mktnm(t,j) + ϵt . Here
mktt is the US aggregate market return in month t, and mktnm(t,j) is the return in the jth newsy month (Jan, Apr, Jul, Oct)
preceding month t. Column 2 reports the same regression as in 1, but on the subsample where the dependent P
variable is returns
of the newsy months. Column 3 is for the non-newsy months. Column 4 reports the results of mktt = α + β1 4j=1 mktnm(t,j) +
P
β2 ( 4j=1 mktnm(t,j) ) × Itnm + β3 Itnm + ϵt , where Itnm is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 when month t is newsy. Column
5-7 report results for the regression in column 4 on the subsamples of the post-WW2 period (1947-2021), the first half (1926-1973),
and the second half (1974-2021). T-statistics computed with White standard errors are reported in square brackets.

Table 2.5

Lead-lag relations of US monthly market returns, actual vs simulated data
Actual
(1)
P4

j=1 mktnm(t,j)

P4

j=1

P12

j=1

P12

j=1

P8

j=1

P8

j=1

mktnm(t,j) ×

Itnm

(3)

(4)

0.129***

0.128***

0.015

0.014

[4.76]

[4.43]

[0.75]

[0.71]

-0.232***

-0.216***

-0.019

-0.023

[-4.93]

[-5.01]

[-0.62]

[-0.69]

mktt−j
mktt−j ×

Itnm

(2)

(5)

0.042**

0.007

[2.39]

[0.71]

-0.090***

0.000

[-2.77]

[-0.01]

mktnnm(t,j)
mktnnm(t,j) ×

Simulated

Itnm

(6)

0.004

0.003

[0.15]

[0.21]

-0.031

0.011

[-0.69]

[0.51]

N

1,136

1,134

1,134

1,136

1,134

1,134

R-sq

0.047

0.028

0.049

0.003

0.003

0.006

Column 1-3 are on actual data. Column 4-6 perform the same set of regressions on simulated
data. Column P
1 of this table reportsPresults from the following monthly time-series regression:
4
4
mktt = α + β1 j=1 mktnm(t,j) + β2 ( j=1 mktnm(t,j) ) × Itnm + β3 Itnm + ϵt . Here mktt is the US
aggregate market return in month t, mktnm(t,j) is the return in the jth newsy month (Jan, Apr,
Jul, Oct) preceding the month t, and Itnm is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 when month
P12
t is newsy. Column 2 reports results of the following regression: mktt = α + β1 j=1 mktt−j +
P12
β2 ( j=1 mktt−j ) × Itnm + β3 Itnm + ϵt . Here mktt−j is the aggregate market returns j calendar
months before
3 is the regression in column 1 with two additional independent
P8 month t. Column P
8
variables j=1 mktnnm(t,j) and ( j=1 mktnnm(t,j) ) × Itnm . Here, mktnnm(t,j) is the US aggregate
market return in the jth non-newsy month preceding the month t. Data are monthly from 1926
to 2021. Column 4-6 report results from the same regressions as in column 1-3 respectively, except
here they are done on simulated AR(1) times series with the first order autocorrelation of 0.11. The
regression coefficients in column 4-6 are average of the 10,000 coefficients each computed from a
separate simulation. For column 1-3, t-statistics computed with White standard errors are reported
in square brackets. For column 4-6, standard errors are standard deviations of coefficients across
simulations, and the corresponding t-statistics are reported in square brackets.
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Table 2.6

Lead-lag relations of US monthly earnings
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

All

NM

Non-NM

Difference

Panel A: Report Lag ≤ 92 & Group 3 Month FQ end
P12
0.051*** 0.027*** 0.064*** -0.036***
j=1 roet−j
N

[5.30]

[3.96]

[5.81]

[-3.57]

587

196

391

587

Panel B: Report Lag ≤ 92
P12

j=1

roet−j

N

0.060***

0.041***

0.070***

-0.029***

[5.32]

[4.56]

[5.97]

[-3.31]

587

196

391

587

Panel C: Group 3 Month FQ end
P12

j=1

roet−j

N

0.053***

0.025***

0.067***

-0.043***

[5.58]

[3.71]

[6.46]

[-4.17]

587

196

391

587

Panel D: No filter
P12

j=1 roet−j

N

0.060***

0.040***

0.071***

-0.032***

[5.24]

[4.63]

[5.76]

[-3.32]

587

196

391

587

Column
P12 1 of this table reports results from the following monthly time-series regressions: roet = α +
β j=1 roet−j + ϵt . Here roet is the aggregate roe, or the aggregate net income before extraordinary
items divided by aggregate book value of equity, of firms announcing their earnings in month t.
Column 2 and 3 report results from the same regression except on the subsample where the dependent
variables are newsy and non-newsy month returns, respectively. Column 4 reports the difference
between column 2 and 3. Panel A aggregates ROE only on firm-quarters that are 1) reporting
within 92 days and 2) aligned with calendar quarters. Panel B applies only the first filter; panel C
only the second; panel D none. Data are monthly from 1971 to 2021. T-statistics computed with
Newey-West standard errors are reported in square brackets.
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Table 2.7

No reversal in the pre-season portion of the newsy months
US

P4

j=1 mktnm(t,j)

const
N
52

R-sq

Global

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

mktt

mktFt W

W
mktExclF
t

mktc,t

mktPc,tS

S
mktExclP
c,t

-0.103***

0.019

-0.120***

-0.029

0.011

-0.040**

[-2.67]

[1.03]

[-2.92]

[-1.07]

[0.76]

[-2.29]

0.017***

0.005***

0.012***

0.017***

0.008***

0.009***

[4.60]

[3.35]

[3.38]

[3.21]

[2.66]

[2.72]

378

378

378

2,305

2,305

2,305

0.029

0.005

0.047

0.006

0.002

0.022
P
Column 1 of this table reports results from the following monthly time-series regression: mktt = α + β 4j=1 mktnm(t,j) + ϵt , on
the subsample where the dependent variable is the first month of a quarter, or Jan, Apr, Jul, Oct. Here mktt the market return
in month t, and mktnm(t,j) is the market return in the jth newsy month preceding month t. Column 2 replaces the dependent
variable with mktFt W , which is the aggregate market return in the first five trading days in month t. Column 3 has the dependent
W , which is the aggregate market return in month t excluding the first five trading days. Column 4 does the
variable mktExclF
t
P
regression mktc,t = α + β 4j=1 mktc,nm(t,j) + ϵc,t , again on cases where month t are the first months of the quarters. Here mktc,t
is the aggregate market return in month t for country c, and mktc,nm(t,j) is the aggregate market return in the jth newsy “month"
(Jan+Feb, Apr+May, Jul+Aug, Oct+Nov) preceding the month t for country c. Column 5 replaces the dependent variable with
mktPc,tS , the pre-earnings season returns. They are returns in the first 5, 10, or 15 trading day of the month, depending on country
S , which equals mkt
PS
c’s reporting speed. Column 6 changes the dependent variable to mktExclP
c,t − mktc,t . For the US sample,
c,t
data are monthly from 1926 to 2021. For the global sample, data are monthly from 1964 to 2021. This shorter sample is due to the
availability of the daily return data. T-statistics computed with White standard errors are reported in square brackets for column
1-3. Columns 4-6 use standard errors clustered at the monthly level.

Table 2.8

Weak dynamic autocorrelation in Q1
Q2, Q3, and Q4

P4

j=1 mktnm(t,j)
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const
N
R-sq

Q1

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Group 1

Group 2

Group 3

Jan

Feb

Mar

-0.125***

0.173***

0.121***

-0.024

0.056

0.084

[-2.83]

[3.67]

[2.95]

[-0.35]

[1.07]

[1.14]

0.017***

0.003

0.000

0.016***

0.003

0.002

[3.79]

[0.69]

[0.10]

[2.88]

[0.58]

[0.33]

283

284

284

95

95

95

0.040

0.088

0.054

0.002

0.015 0.023
P
This table reports results from the following monthly time-series regression: mktt = α + β 4j=1 mktnm(t,j) + ϵt . Here mktt is
the US aggregate market return in month t, and mktnm(t,j) is the return in the jth newsy month (Jan, Apr, Jul, Oct) preceding
month t. Column 1-3 are where the dependent variables are group 1-3 months outside the first quarter. Column 4-6 are where the
dependent variables are returns of January, February, and March. Data are monthly from 1926 to 2021. T-statistics computed with
White standard errors are reported in square brackets.

Table 2.9

Survey evidence from IBES

P12

j=1 Supt−j

P12

j=1 Supt−j

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

All

NM

Non-NM

All

All

0.061***

0.049***

0.068***

0.068***

[8.54]

[4.82]

[9.96]

[9.95]

× Itnm

-0.019**
[-2.18]

P4

j=1 Supnm(t,j)

0.584***
[3.12]

P4

j=1 Supnm(t,j)

× Itnm

-0.064**
[-2.26]

Itnm
const
N

0.001***

0.001***

[7.71]

[6.12]

-0.000

0.000***

-0.000***

-0.000***

-0.001***

[-1.08]

[3.62]

[-3.90]

[-3.87]

[-5.91]

419

140

279

419

419

Column 1 of this
P12table reports results from the following monthly time-series regression:
Supt = α + β j=1 Supt−j + ϵt . Here Supt is the aggregate earnings surprise in month t,
which is market cap weighted average of firm level earnings surprises of all firms announcing
in month t. The firm level earnings surprises are computed as the difference between realized
EPS and expected EPS divided by the firm’s stock price at the end of the previous month.
Column 2 reports the same regression as in 1, but on the subsample where the dependent
variable is aggregate surprises of the newsy months. Column 3 is for the non-newsy months.
Column 4 reports the difference between the coefficients in column 2 and 3, extracted from
a regression with additional interaction terms to Itnm , which is a dummy variable taking
value 1 if month t is newsy. Column 5 performs the same regression as in column 4, except
additionally confine the surprises on the right-hand-side to be those in newsy months. Data
are monthly from 1985 to 2021. T-statistics computed with Newey-West standard errors are
reported in square brackets.
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Table 2.10

Lead-lag relations of monthly excess industry returns in the US
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

All

NM

Non-NM

Difference

0.023

-0.036

0.052**

-0.087**

[1.23]

[-1.40]

[2.14]

[-2.49]

-0.004

-0.024

0.005

-0.029

[-0.28]

[-0.90]

[0.29]

[-0.90]

0.024

-0.012

0.042**

-0.054

[1.47]

[-0.42]

[2.17]

[-1.56]

0.036**

0.004

0.052**

-0.048

[2.21]

[0.15]

[2.48]

[-1.51]

-0.001

0.001

-0.001***

0.002***

[-1.48]

[1.44]

[-3.10]

[2.83]

N

19,108

6,353

12,755

19,108

R-sq

0.003

0.002

0.009

0.006

exreti,nm(t,1)
exreti,nm(t,2)
exreti,nm(t,3)
exreti,nm(t,4)
const

Column 1 of this table
P reports results from the following industry-month level panel regression: exreti,t = α+ 4j=1 βj exreti,nm(t,j) +ϵi,t . Here exreti,t is the value weighted average return of industry i in excess of the market in month t, and exreti,nm(t,j) is the excess return in
the jth newsy month (Jan, Apr, Jul, Oct) preceding month t. The industry is defined by the
firm’s 4-digit SIC code. Column 2 reports the same regression on the subsample where the
dependent variable is returns of the newsy months. Column 3 is for the non-newsy months.
Column 4 reports the difference
extracted from
P4 between the coefficients
P4 in column 2 and 3,nm
this regression exreti,t = α+ j=1 βj exreti,nm(t,j) + j=1 γj exreti,nm(t,j) ×It +δItnm +ϵi,t ,
where Itnm is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 when month t is newsy. Regressions
are weighted by the market cap of industry i as of the month t − 1, normalized by the total
market cap in the cross section. 20 stocks are required in each month-industry. Data are
monthly from 1926 to 2021. T-statistics computed with clustered standard errors by month
are reported in square brackets.

55

Table 2.11

Lead-lag relations of monthly excess industry returns in US, by different
industry measures
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

All

NM

Non-NM

Difference

Panel A: SIC Major Group
P4

j=1

exreti,nm(t,j)

0.021***

-0.012

0.038***

-0.050***

[2.89]

[-0.96]

[4.35]

[-3.26]

N

28,028

9,327

18,701

28,028

R-sq

0.002

0.001

0.007

0.004

Panel B: SIC Industry Group
P4

j=1

exreti,nm(t,j)

0.020***

-0.008

0.034***

-0.041***

[2.76]

[-0.64]

[3.81]

[-2.78]

N

24,082

8,037

16,045

24,082

R-sq

0.002

0.000

0.005

0.004

0.038***

-0.055***

Panel C: SIC Industry
P4

j=1

exreti,nm(t,j)

0.020**

-0.017

[2.51]

[-1.39]

[3.84]

[-3.50]

N

19,108

6,353

12,755

19,108

R-sq

0.002

0.001

0.007

0.005

Column 1 of thisP
table reports results from the following industry-month level panel regression:
4
exreti,t = α + β j=1 exreti,nm(t,j) + ϵi,t . Here exreti,t is the value weighted average return of
industry i in excess of the market in month t, and exreti,nm(t,j) is the excess return in the jth
newsy month (Jan, Apr, Jul, Oct) preceding month t. Column 2 reports the same regression on the
subsample where the dependent variable are returns of the newsy months. Column 3 is for the nonnewsy months. Column 4 reports theP
difference between the coefficients
in column 2 and 3, extracted
P4
4
from this regression exreti,t = α + β j=1 exreti,nm(t,j) + γ j=1 exreti,nm(t,j) × Itnm + δItnm + ϵi,t ,
where Itnm is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 when month t is newsy. Panel A to C differ
only in the industry variable used. Regressions are weighted by the market cap of industry i as of
the month t − 1, normalized by the total market cap of each cross section. 20 stocks are required
in each month-industry. Data are monthly from 1926 to 2021. T-statistics computed with clustered
standard errors by month are reported in square brackets.
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Table 2.12

Lead-lag relations of monthly excess industry earnings in US
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

All

NM

Non-NM

Difference

Panel A: Report Lag ≤ 92 & Group 3 Month FQ end
P12

exroei,t−j

0.027***

0.016***

0.054***

-0.037***

[7.03]

[4.51]

[10.57]

[-6.96]

N

18,462

6,958

11,504

18,462

R-sq

0.090

0.060

0.169

0.125

j=1

Panel B: Report Lag ≤ 92
P12

j=1 exroei,t−j

0.044***
[11.53]

0.033***
[6.81]

0.064***
[13.82]

-0.031***
[-4.75]

N

24,835

8,683

16,152

24,835

R-sq

0.148

0.125

0.194

0.165

Panel C: Group 3 Month FQ end
P12

j=1 exroei,t−j

0.027***

0.017***

0.053***

-0.036***

[7.13]

[4.87]

[10.18]

[-6.82]

N

19,206

7,215

11,991

19,206

R-sq

0.096

0.068

0.171

0.129

Panel D: No filter
P12

exroei,t−j

0.043***

0.033***

0.061***

-0.029***

[11.26]

[7.00]

[12.73]

[-4.50]

N

25,812

9,015

16,797

25,812

R-sq

0.148

0.129

0.188

0.163

j=1

Column 1 of thisPtable reports results from the following industry-month level panel regression:
12
exroei,t = α + β j=1 exroei,t−j + ϵt . Here exroei,t = roei,t − roet , where roei,t is the roe aggregated for industry i among all of its announcers in month t, or the aggregate net income before
extraordinary items divided by aggregate book value of equity, and roet is the aggregate roe on all
firms announcing in month t. The ROE is then winsorized at the 10th and the 90th percentiles
of each cross section to limit the impact of extreme data. It is filled with a neutral value of zero
when missing as part of the independent variable, but kept missing when used individually as the
dependent variable. Column 2 and 3 report results from the same regression except on the subsample where the dependent variables are newsy and non-newsy month returns, respectively. Column
4 reports the difference between column 2 and 3. Panel A aggregates ROE only on firm-quarters
that are 1) reporting within 92 days and 2) aligned with calendar quarters. Panel B applies only
the first filter; panel C only the second; panel D none. The regressions are weighted by aggregate
book value of equity of the industry-month divided by the total book value of the year. 20 stocks
are required for each industry-quarter. Data are monthly from 1971 to 2021. T-statistics computed
with standard errors double clustered at the month, industry level are reported in square brackets.
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Table 2.13

Heterogeneous effect across industries
(1)

(2)

connectivity

(3)

(4)

(5)

entry cost

(6)

(7)

balance

(8)
size

low

high

low

high

low

high

small

large

0.041**

0.057***

0.047**

0.058***

0.043*

0.063***

0.018***

0.030***

[2.35]

[2.85]

[2.02]

[3.00]

[1.95]

[3.40]

[3.30]

[4.57]

-0.039

-0.134***

-0.040

-0.115***

-0.041

-0.123***

-0.016

-0.031***

[-1.28]

[-4.03]

[-1.05]

[-3.31]

[-1.00]

[-3.81]

[-1.61]

[-2.84]

N

7,571

7,290

5,376

4,899

4,830

5,390

250,034

183,316

R-sq

0.004

0.013

0.005

0.011

0.004

0.013

0.002

0.002

P4

j=1 exreti,nm(t,j)
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P4

j=1 exreti,nm(t,j)

×

Itnm

P4

P4
This table reports results on the following industry-month level panel regression: exreti,t = α+β1 j=1 exreti,nm(t,j) +β2 ( j=1 exreti,nm(t,j) ×
Itnm ) + β3 Itnm + ϵi,t . Here exreti,t is the value weighted return of industry i in excess of the market in month t, exreti,nm(t,j) is excess return in
the jth newsy month (Jan, Apr, Jul, Oct) preceding month t, and Itnm is a dummy variable indicating whether month t is newsy. Column (1)
and (2) perform the regression on the subsamples where the within industry ROE connectivity is respectively low and high. Column (3) and
(4) perform a similar exercise on low and high entry cost industries. Column (5) and (6) are on unbalanced and balanced industries. Column
(7) and (8) are on industries with a small and larger number of stocks. 20 stocks are required in each industry-month, except for the last two
columns, where no size filter is applied. Data are monthly from 1971 to 2021 for columns 1-6, and from 1926 to 2021 for columns 7-8. T-stats
computed with standard errors clustered at the month level are reported in square brackets.

Table 2.14

Placebo test: no effect on fake ‘industries’

P4

j=1 exreti,nm(t,j)

P4

j=1 exreti,nm(t,j)

×

Itnm

N
R-sq

(1)

(2)

unclassified

random

-0.028

-0.003

[-0.77]

[-0.49]

0.065

0.005

[0.98]

[0.47]

256

30,704

0.010

0.000

This table reports results on the following ‘industry’-month level panel regression: exreti,t = α +
P4
P4
β1 j=1 exreti,nm(t,j) + β2 ( j=1 exreti,nm(t,j) × Itnm ) + β3 Itnm + ϵi,t . Here exreti,t is the value
weighted return of industry i in excess of the market in month t, exreti,nm(t,j) is excess return in the
jth newsy month (Jan, Apr, Jul, Oct) preceding month t, and Itnm is a dummy variable indicating
whether month t is newsy. Column (1) performs the regression on the ‘industry’ consisting of stocks
with SIC codes of 9910, 9990, 9999—which represent unclassified—and missing SIC code. Column
2 does the regression on the ‘industries’ represented by randomly generated SIC codes that takes
on 30 values with equal probability. Data are from 1972 to 2021 for column 1, and from 1926 to
2021 for column 2. 20 stocks are required in each industry-month. T-stats computed with standard
errors clustered at the month level are reported in square brackets.
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Table 2.15

Newsyness of Q2 in US across various half lives
2

3

4

5

6

7

14

30

60

Apr

0.92

0.97

0.95

0.92

0.88

0.85

0.82

0.70

0.62

0.58

May

0.06

0.02

0.04

0.08

0.11

0.15

0.18

0.30

0.38

0.41

Jun

0.03

0.01

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.01

0.01

0.01
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1

This table shows the value of quantitative newsyness of Q2 with various of half-life values for the aggregate market as of 2021.

Table 2.16

Quantitative newsyness and performance
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Discrete

3-day

4-day

5-day

Panel A: US Industries excess returns
β1

0.042***

0.058***

0.062***

0.066***

[3.84]

[3.70]

[3.68]

[3.68]

-0.061***

-0.125***

-0.133***

-0.142***

[-3.50]

[-4.39]

[-4.30]

[-4.25]

N

19,108

14,748

14,748

14,748

R-sq

0.005

0.009

0.009

0.009

β2

Panel B: Country excess returns
β1

0.087***
[3.90]

[1.53]

[1.90]

[2.18]

β2

-0.063**

-0.070*

-0.090*

-0.103*

[-2.14]

[-1.73]

[-1.91]

[-1.91]

19,062

5,570

5,570

,5570

0.004

0.007

0.007

0.007

N
R-sq

0.038

0.052*

0.064**

Panel C: Country-Industries excess returns
β1

0.046*

0.038**

0.042**

0.045**

[1.74]

[2.27]

[2.29]

[2.31]

β2

-0.068**

-0.071**

-0.078**

-0.083**

[-2.17]

[-2.09]

[-2.04]

[-2.01]

N

28,624

10,391

10,391

10,391

R-sq

0.004

0.004

0.004

0.004

In panel A, column 2-4 run the following industry-month level panel regressions with 3, 4, and 5
nw
day half-lives exreti,t = α + β1 exret12nw
i,t + β2 exret12i,t × N ewi,t + β3 N ewi,t + ϵi,t . Here exreti,t is
market cap weighted return of industry i in excess of the market in month t. N ewi,t is the newsyness
P12
for industry i in month t, and exret12nw
i,t =
j=1 exreti,t−j · N ewi,t−j is the average excess return
for industry i over the past 12 months, weighted by each month’s newsyness. Column 1 is the
version of the regression with discrete, binary newsyness, except the independent variable is scaled
to have the same dispersion as exret12nw
i,t with 4-day half-life, so that the coefficients are roughly
comparable across columns. Panel B and C are analogous exercises with country level excess returns
and country-industry level excess returns. In panel A and C the regressions are weighted by the
industry’s market cap normalized by the cross section’s total market cap. Panel B uses equal weight.
For column 2-4, data are monthly from 1973 to 2021 in panel A and 2000 to 2021 in B and C. The
later starting dates arises from the computation of the quantitative newsyness measures. T-statistics
computed with standard errors clustered at the month level are reported in square brackets.
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Table 2.17

Global company-fiscal period count by reporting month group
Both filters

Rpt Lag <= 183

Group 3 FQ end

No filter
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Count

Pct

Count

Pct

Count

Pct

Count

Pct

Group 1: Jan/Apr/Jul/Oct

168,568

19.76

222,976

22.94

173,502

19.94

228,720

23.07

Group 2: Feb/May/Aug/Nov

534,837

62.70

550,727

56.66

542,855

62.38

559,349

56.41

Group 3: Mar/Jun/Sep/Dec

149,654

17.54

198,271

20.40

153,906

17.68

203,448

20.52

Total

853,059

100

971,974

100.00

870,263

100.00

991,517

100.00

The table tabulates the number of company-quarter by 3 groups, where the groups are determined by the remainder of the reporting
month divided by 3. If a company reports earnings for a given fiscal quarter in October, this company-quarter belongs to group
1, as 10 ≡ 1 mod 3. First two columns contain count and percentage on the sample where 1) reporting within 183 days and 2)
aligned with calendar quarters. The next two columns do the same tabulation with only the first filter. The next two columns
apply only the second filter. The last two columns apply no filter. Data are quarterly and semi-annually from 1998 to 2021.

Table 2.18

Lead-lag relations of monthly earnings in other countries
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

All

NM

Non-NM

Difference

Panel A: Report Lag ≤ 183 & Group 3 Month FQ end
P12
0.015*** 0.013*** 0.043***
-0.031**
j=1 roec,t−j
[4.08]

[3.65]

[3.52]

[-2.39]

N

5,369

3,654

1,715

5,369

R-sq

0.048

0.046

0.096

0.060

Panel B: Report Lag ≤ 183
P12

j=1 roec,t−j

N
R-sq

0.012*

0.010*

0.041***

-0.031**

[1.78]

[1.70]

[3.11]

[-2.15]

5,452

3,664

1,788

5,452

0.052

0.044

0.170

0.072

Panel C: Group 3 Month FQ end
P12

roec,t−j

0.013***

0.012***

0.042***

-0.031**

[3.90]

[3.45]

[3.56]

[-2.50]

N

5,382

3,659

1,723

5,382

R-sq

0.042

0.040

0.094

0.055

j=1

Panel D: No filter
P12

roec,t−j

0.012*

0.010*

0.041***

-0.031**

[1.78]

[1.70]

[3.16]

[-2.18]

N

5,457

3,666

1,791

5,457

R-sq

0.049

0.042

0.159

0.068

j=1

Column 1 of this
P12table reports results from the following country-month level panel regressions:
roec,t = α + β j=1 roec,t−j + ϵc,t . Here roec,t is the aggregate roe, or the aggregate net income
before extraordinary items divided by aggregate book value of equity, of firms reporting their earnings
in month t. It is then winsorized at the 10th and the 90th percentiles per cross section. It is filled
with a neutral value of zero when missing as part of the independent variable, but kept missing when
used individually as the dependent variable. Column 2 and 3 report results from the same regression
except on the subsample where the dependent variables are newsy and non-newsy month returns,
respectively. Column 4 reports the difference between column 2 and 3. Panel A aggregates ROE
only on firm-quarters that are 1) aligned with calendar quarters and 2) reporting within 183 days.
Panel B applies only the first filter; panel C only the second; panel D none. The regressions are
weighted by aggregate book value of equity of the country-month divided by the total book value of
the year. Data are monthly from 1998 to 2021. T-statistics computed with standard errors double
clustered at the month, country level are reported in square brackets.
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Table 2.19

Lead-lag relations of monthly market returns in other countries

P4

j=1 mktc,nm(t,j)

P4

j=1 mktc,nm(t,j)

×

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

All

NM

Non-NM

All

Post-WW2

First-Half

Second-Half

0.010

-0.003

0.037***

0.037***

0.038**

0.025*

0.043**

[1.21]

[-0.30]

[2.77]

[2.78]

[2.55]

[1.72]

[2.28]

-0.040**

-0.041**

-0.023

-0.049**

[-2.36]

[-2.15]

[-1.25]

[-2.03]

0.007*

0.007

0.006*

0.007

[1.84]

[1.61]

[1.93]

[1.26]

Itnm

Itnm
64
const

0.009***

0.011***

0.004

0.004

0.005

0.004

0.004

[5.10]

[5.23]

[1.47]

[1.47]

[1.40]

[1.45]

[1.05]

N

19,477

12,980

6,497

19,477

16,665

7,201

12,276

R-sq

0.001

0.000

0.012

0.004

0.005

0.003

0.006
P4

Column 1 of this table reports results from the following country-month panel regressions: mktc,t = α + β j=1 mktc,nm(t,j) + ϵc,t .
Here mktc,t is the aggregate market return in month t for country c, and mktnm(t,j) is the aggregate market return in the jth newsy
“month" (Jan+Feb, Apr+May, Jul+Aug, Oct+Nov) preceding month t for country c. Column 2 reports the same regression as in
1, but on the subsample where the dependent variable is returns of the newsy months. Column 3 is for the non-newsy months.
Column 4 reports the difference between the coefficients in column 2 and 3, extracted from a regression with additional interaction
terms to Itnm , a dummy variable taking value 1 if month t is newsy. Column 5-7 report results for the regression in column 4 on
the subsamples of the post-WW2 period (1947-2021), the first half (1926-1973), and the second half (1974-2021). Data are monthly
from 1926 to 2021 for column 1-4. T-statistics computed with clustered standard errors by month are reported in square brackets.

Table 2.20

Lead-lag relations of monthly market excess returns in other countries

P4

j=1 exmktc,nm(t,j)

P4

j=1 exmktc,nm(t,j)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

All

NM

Non-NM

All

Post-war

First-Half

Second-Half

0.018***

0.009

0.035***

0.035***

0.038***

0.016

0.050***

[2.99]

[1.23]

[3.90]

[3.90]

[3.85]

[1.19]

[4.13]

-0.025**

-0.029**

-0.006

-0.043***

[-2.14]

[-2.22]

[-0.34]

[-2.81]

0.002

0.002

0.004

0.001

[1.00]

[0.99]

[1.29]

[0.25]

× Itnm

Itnm
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const

0.002*

0.002**

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.002

0.000

[1.88]

[2.14]

[0.26]

[0.27]

[0.09]

[0.81]

[0.06]

N

19,062

12,692

6,370

19,062

16,444

6,899

12,163

R-sq

0.003

0.001

0.011

0.004

0.005

0.002

0.007
P4

Column 1 of this table reports results from the following country-month panel regressions: exmktc,t = α+β j=1 exmktc,nm(t,j) +ϵc,t .
U S mkt
US
Here exmktc,t = mktc,t − β̂c,t−1
U S,t − (1 − β̂c,t−1 )rft−1 . It is the aggregate market return in month t for country c subtract the
US market return in month t multiplied by country’s loading on the US return, which is estimated on a rolling 24 months basis, and
then subtract 1 minus this beta times the risk free rate. This corresponds to a long-short portfolio return. Notice this beta estimate
is available at the end of month t − 1. mktnm(t,j) is the aggregate market return in the jth newsy “month" (Jan+Feb, Apr+May,
Jul+Aug, Oct+Nov) preceding month t for country c. Column 2 reports the same regression as in 1, but on the subsample where
the dependent variable is returns of the newsy months. Column 3 is for the non-newsy months. Column 4 reports the difference
between the coefficients in column 2 and 3, extracted from a regression with additional interaction terms to Itnm , a dummy variable
taking value 1 if month t is newsy. Column 5-7 report results for the regression in column 4 on the subsamples of the post war
period (1947-2021), the first half (1926-1973), and the second half (1974-2021). Data are monthly from 1926 to 2021 for column
1-4. T-statistics computed with clustered standard errors by month are reported in square brackets.

Table 2.21

Lead-lag relations of monthly industry excess earnings in other countries
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

All

NM

Non-NM

Difference

Panel A: Report Lag ≤ 183 & Group 3 Month FQ end
P12

exroec,i,t−j

0.023***

0.019***

0.073***

-0.054***

[4.68]

[4.11]

[7.64]

[-5.17]

N

13,311

10,268

3,043

13,311

R-sq

0.055

0.046

0.167

0.078

j=1

Panel B: Report Lag ≤ 183
P12

j=1 exroec,i,t−j

0.037***
[13.37]

0.031***
[11.57]

0.077***
[11.09]

-0.046***
[-6.24]

N

17,737

12,315

5,422

17,737

R-sq

0.098

0.081

0.222

0.116

Panel C: Group 3 Month FQ end
P12

j=1 exroec,i,t−j

0.023***

0.019***

0.070***

-0.051***

[4.79]

[4.23]

[7.96]

[-5.22]

N

13,740

10,582

3,158

13,740

R-sq

0.055

0.047

0.153

0.077

Panel D: No filter
P12

exroec,i,t−j

0.036***

0.031***

0.075***

-0.044***

[13.90]

[12.01]

[10.80]

[-5.96]

N

18,244

12,678

5,566

18,244

R-sq

0.098

0.082

0.214

0.114

j=1

Column 1 of this table reports
P12 results from the following country-industry-month level panel regressions: exroec,i,t = α + β j=1 exroec,i,t−j + ϵc,i,t . Here exroec,i,t = roec,i,t − roec,t , where roec,i,t
is the roe of industry i of country c in month t, or the aggregate net income before extraordinary
items divided by aggregate book value of equity, of firms of industry i in country c reporting their
earnings in month t, and roec,t is the country-month aggregate roe. It is then winsorized at the
10th and the 90th percentiles per cross section. It is filled with a neutral value of zero when missing as part of the independent variable, but kept missing when used individually as the dependent
variable. Column 2 and 3 report results from the same regression except on the subsample where
the dependent variables are newsy and non-newsy month returns, respectively. Column 4 reports
the difference between column 2 and 3. Panel A aggregates ROE only on firm-quarters that are
1) aligned with calendar quarters and 2) reporting within 183 days. Panel B applies only the first
filter; panel C only the second; panel D none. The regressions are weighted by aggregate book value
of equity of the country-month divided by the total book value of the year. 20 stocks are required
for each country-industry-quarter. Data are monthly from 1998 to 2021. T-statistics computed with
standard errors double clustered at the month, country level are reported in square brackets.
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Table 2.22

Lead-lag relations of monthly industry excess returns in other countries
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

All

NM

Non-NM

Difference

Panel A: SIC Major Group
P4

exretc,i,nm(t,j)

0.003

-0.007

0.024

-0.032*

[0.38]

[-0.82]

[1.51]

[-1.72]

N

47,281

31,545

15,736

47,281

R-sq

0.000

0.000

0.005

0.002

j=1

Panel B: SIC Industry Group
P4

j=1

exretc,i,nm(t,j)

-0.000

-0.016

0.031*

-0.047**

[-0.03]

[-1.59]

[1.74]

[-2.30]

N

34,383

22,925

11,458

34,383

R-sq

0.000

0.002

0.007

0.004

-0.015

0.030*

-0.045**

Panel C: SIC Industry
P4

j=1

exretc,i,nm(t,j)

0.000
[0.04]

[-1.33]

[1.73]

[-2.18]

N

28,622

19,087

9,535

28,622

R-sq

0.000

0.002

0.007

0.004

Column 1 of this P
table reports results from the following country-industry-month panel regressions:
4
exretc,i,t = α + β j=1 exretc,i,nm(t,j) + ϵc,i,t . Here exretc,i,t , is the value weighted average return of
industry i in excess of the market of country c in month t, and exretc,i,nm(t,j) is the excess return in
the jth newsy “month" (Jan+Feb, Apr+May, Jul+Aug, Oct+Nov) preceding the month t. Column
2 reports the same regression on the subsample where the dependent variable is returns of the
newsy months. Column 3 is for the non-newsy months. Column 4 reports the P
difference between the
4
coefficients in column 2 and 3, extracted from this regression exretc,i,t = α+β j=1 exretc,i,nm(t,j) +
P4
γ j=1 exretc,i,nm(t,j) × Itnm + δItnm + ϵc,i,t , where Itnm is a dummy variable taking value 1 if month
t is newsy. Panel A to C differ only in the industry variable used. Regressions are weighted by the
market cap of industry i as of the month t − 1, normalized by the total market cap of the cross
section. 20 stocks are required in each month-country-industry. Data are monthly from 1986 to 2021.
T-statistics computed with clustered standard errors by month are reported in square brackets.
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Table 2.23

Lead-lag relations of monthly market returns in US, by decades

P4

j=1 mktnm(t,j)

P4

j=1 mktnm(t,j)
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Itnm
const
N
R-sq

× Itnm

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

-1939

1940-49

1950-59

1960-69

1970-79

1980-89

1990-99

2000-09

2010-

0.239***

0.041

0.107*

0.019

0.063

0.072

0.094

0.091

0.146**

[3.88]

[0.52]

[1.81]

[0.28]

[1.37]

[1.52]

[0.89]

[1.41]

[2.19]

-0.408***

-0.138

-0.100

-0.085

-0.117

-0.263**

-0.199

-0.209*

-0.291***

[-3.76]

[-1.17]

[-1.05]

[-0.77]

[-1.05]

[-2.22]

[-1.45]

[-1.75]

[-2.80]

0.037*

0.005

0.008

0.015

0.000

0.014

0.011

-0.000

0.036***

[1.94]

[0.56]

[0.91]

[1.28]

[0.04]

[1.33]

[1.03]

[-0.03]

[3.12]

-0.011

0.008

0.006

0.003

0.007

0.009

0.009

0.001

-0.004

[-1.23]

[1.47]

[1.11]

[0.43]

[1.42]

[1.44]

[1.05]

[0.28]

[-0.57]

159

120

120

120

120

120

120

120

137

0.114

0.009

0.029

0.022

0.018

0.063

0.026

0.040

0.069
P4

Column 1 of this table reports results from the following monthly time-series regressions: mktt = α + β1 j=1 mktnm(t,j) +
P
β2 4j=1 mktnm(t,j) × Itnm + β3 Itnm + ϵt . Here mktt is the US aggregate market return in month t, mktnm(t,j) is the return in the jth
newsy month (Jan, Apr, Jul, Oct) preceding month t, and Itnm is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 when month t is newsy.
The regression is done on different subsamples across columns. T-statistics computed with White standard errors are reported in
square brackets.

Table 2.24

Predicting US aggregate market returns with real time coefficients
Method
R2

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

0.49%

3.72%

3.60%

3.68%

3.97%

3.77%

3.82%

4.30%

The R2 in this table are calculated as 1 −

Pn
(rt −rˆt )2
Pt=1
n
2,
t=1 (rt −rt )

where rt is the expanding window

mean of past stock returns, and rˆt is the forecast being evaluated. This R2 is positive only
when the forecast outperforms the expanding window mean of past stock returns. Method
0 comes solely from Campbell and Thompson (2008) and functions as a benchmark. It is
the valuation constraint + growth specification with fixed coefficients. Simple average is
taken from the Dividend/Price, Earnings/Price, and Book-to-market ratios based forecasts.
Method 1 uses the signal that is simply the sum of past four newsy month returns. The
coefficients are extracted from simple expanding-window OLS of past returns on past signals,
separately for newsy and non-newsy month dependent variables. The signal used in method
2-7 is the sum of past four newsy month returns, subtracting its expanding window mean,
and sign flipped if the dependent variable is a newsy month. Method 2 uses the same
coefficient estimation method as in method 1. Methods 3 replace the constant terms with
the expanding window means of past newsy and non-newsy month returns. Method 4
replace the constant terms with the forecast in method 0. Method 5-7 are method 2-4 with
the coefficients estimated on the combined sample of newsy and non-newsy months. Data
are monthly from 1926 to 2021.
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2.2. Figures
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Figure 2.1: Timing of independent and dependent variables in return forecasting regressions, US
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This figure shows how the independent variables in the US return forecasting regressions progress as the dependent variable move
forward.

Figure 2.2: Next month’s market returns vs past four newsy month returns, by whether the
next month is newsy

Average return next month

3

2

1

0

−1
Low

Mid
Total return during past four newsy months
Next month is newsy

High

Next month is not newsy

This figure plots mean of US monthly aggregate market returns in the next month against
total returns during past four newsy months. The newsy months are the first months of the
calendar quarters, namely January, April, July, and October. The sample is split based on
whether the next month is newsy. Data are monthly from 1926 to 2021. One arm of the
error bars represents 2 standard errors.
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Figure 2.3: Autoregressive coefficients of US monthly aggregate market returns

autoregressive coefficient

0.2

0.1

0.0

−0.1

−0.2
2.5

5.0

7.5
lag in month

10.0

12.5

This figure shows the autoregressive coefficients of US monthly aggregate market returns.
The dotted line is a trend line on the coefficient values over lags. Data are monthly from
1926 to 2021. The error bars represented 2 standard errors.
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Figure 2.4: Distance in calendar and fiscal time of lagged data in an earnings forecasting setting
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This figure shows the dependent and independent variables used by a hypothetical investor trying to forecast the earnings in each
calendar month using past earnings. It demonstrates that past earnings contained over the same look-back window in terms of
calendar time are actually further away in terms of fiscal time—which is what determines the nature of the news—if the dependent
variable is in a newsy month. Fiscal periods corresponding to earnings reported in each calendar month are labeled and color coded.

APPENDIX A
Correlation neglect and evidence
In short, the effect of correlation neglect says that if investors get two consecutive signals
with the second being a thinly-veiled repetition of the first, agents then overreact to the
second signal. This overreaction subsequently corrects itself. In the setting of the earnings
reporting cycle, if we think of the first signal as aggregate earnings announced in the first
month of quarter, and the second as that announced in the second month, correlation neglect
then predicts that 1) the first month return positively predicts the second month return and
2) the second month return negatively predicts the return in the first month of the next
quarter.
A major distinction between that and the main result documented in this paper are noteworthy: It is the second month return that negatively predicts future returns. The main result
instead uses the first month return to negatively predict future returns. In other words, in
the correlation neglect setting the second month is the time of overreaction. In the main
result the first month contains both under and over-reaction.
Notice that correlation neglect does not explain why the first month return is positively
predicting returns in the second and the third months of the next quarter and beyond. It
also does not explain why the first month return is negatively predicting returns in the first
month of the next quarter and beyond. Correlation neglect therefore differs from my story
in two ways: it makes additional predictions, and at the same time does not make some
predictions that my story makes. I therefore am documenting evidence in favor of correlation
neglect in this appendix, so that the two effects can be separated and distinguished.
I document the evidence supporting correlation neglect in Table A.1. Column 1 shows that
aggregate market return in the second months of the quarters negatively predicts returns
in the first month of the next calendar quarter. Column 2 shows that industry level return
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Table A.1: Evidence supporting correlation neglect

β2
β5
β8
β11

(1)
market return
-0.275***
[-3.05]
0.040
[0.73]
0.140
[1.31]
-0.072
[-0.94]

(2)
industry exret
-0.110**
[-2.63]
-0.081**
[-2.08]
-0.001
[-0.02]
0.041
[1.30]

N
378
6,131
R-sq
0.091
0.017
Column 1 shows results from the following monthly time-series regression: mktt = α +
β2 mktt−2 + β5 mktt−5 + β8 mktt−8 + β11 mktt−11 + ϵt , conditioning on month t is a newsy
month. Here mktt is aggregate market return in month t, and mktt−x is aggregate market
return x months before month t. It shows how the market returns in the newsy months
are being predicted by past second months of the quarter. For instance, if the dependent
variable is the return of October, the independent variables are returns of August, May,
February, and November of the previous year. The second column does an analogous regression on an industry-month panel:exreti,t = α + β2 exreti,t−2 + β5 exreti,t−5 + β8 exreti,t−8 +
β11 exreti,t−11 + ϵi,t . T-stats are reported in square brackets. Data are monthly from 1926
to 2021. In the first column, White standard errors are used to compute the t-stats. In the
second column, standard errors clustered at the monthly level are used.
in excess of the market in the second month of the quarter negatively predicts the excess
return in the first month of the next quarter and the quarter afterward. These are precisely
what correlation neglect predicts.
An immediate next step prediction here is that this reversal is substantially stronger when
the signals in the first month and the second month agreed. If one measure the degree of
agreement using the product of the first and the second month returns this prediction does
not pan out. It could be that we need a better measurement of agreement, however. Overall,
the evidence here is interesting but we need more investigations to make a convincing case.
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APPENDIX B
Alternative versions of the models
B.1. Earnings surprises and returns
In the data, aggregate earnings surprises and aggregate market returns have only a small
positive correlation around 0.1. Related, the correlation at the stock level is not too strong
either. This pattern can potentially arise from investors’ correct understanding that part
of the cash flow surprise is temporary. The intuition can be reflected in my model, which I
P
j
compactly summarize below. Let ∆dt+1 = dt+1 − bt , where bt = ∞
j=0 ρ dt−j , as before.
Investors’ beliefs:

∆dt+1
ut+1
yt+1
xt

= yt+1 + ut+1
iid

∼ N (0, σu ),

∀t

= mxt + vt+1
∞
X
=
δ j yt−j
j=0

Notice that investors correctly understand that ut is purely temporary and does not impact
future cash flow growth, even though it entered past cash flow growth. This leads to a
two-state-variable solution for the valuation ratio as before:
Pnt
= ean +bn xt +cn
Dt
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where:

an = an−1 + log r +

(bn−1 + cn−1 + 1)2 2 (cn−1 + 1)2 2
σv +
σu
2
2

bn = (m + δ)bn−1 + (1 + cn−1 )m
cn = −ρ

This set of valuation, combined with the realization of:

yt+1 =



 hxt + vt+1 , where t is even

 lxt + vt+1 , where t is odd

Leads to returns:

log(1 + Rn,t+1 ) = an−1 − an + (h − m)(bn−1 + 1 − ρ)xt +
bn−1 vt+1 + (1 − ρ)(vt+1 + ut+1 ), where t is even
log(1 + Rn,t+1 ) = an−1 − an + (h − m)(bn−1 + 1 − ρ)xt +
bn−1 vt+1 + (1 − ρ)(vt+1 + ut+1 ), where t is odd

Notice that ut+1 and vt+1 equally enter ∆dt+1 . However, due to the multiplier bn−1 , vt+1
is much more important than ut+1 as a component of the returns. This is because vt enters
xt and thus influences valuation, while ut does not.

B.2. Past cash flow growth unevenly enters valuation
We see that aggregate market returns in the newsy months are mainly responsible for predicting future returns. In our previous versions of the models, both kinds of past returns
positively predict future non-newsy months returns, and negatively predict future newsy
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months returns. A potential explanation for this distinction from the independent variable’s
perspective is that investors re-form their earnings forecasts mainly around earnings seasons.
The intuition can be added in my model, which I go over below. Let ∆dt+1 = dt+1 − bt ,
P
j
where bt = ∞
j=0 ρ dt−j , as before.
Investors’ beliefs:

∆dt+1
ut+1

= mxt + ut+1
iid

xt

∼ N (0, σu ), ∀t


P

j
 ∞
j=0 δ ∆dt−2j
=

P

j
 ∞
j=0 δ ∆dt−2j−1

where t is odd
where t is even

Notice only the odd period ∆dt enters xt . This then leads to the following iteration rule:

xt =




(m + δ)x

t−1

+ ut



xt−1

where t is odd
where t is even

These together lead to a two-state-variable form for the valuation ratio as before, except
that now there is a superscript indicating an additional dependence on whether t is even or
odd:

Pnt
Dt

=




ea1n +b1n xt +c1n

where t is odd



ea0n +b0n xt +c0n

where t is even
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The iteration rules are:

a1n = a0n−1 + log r +

(c0n−1 + 1)2 2
σu
2

b1n = b0n−1 + (1 + c0n−1 )m
c1n = −ρ

When t is even:

a0n = a1n−1 + log r +

(b1n−1 + c1n−1 + 1)2 2
σu
2

b0n = (m + δ)b1n−1 + (1 + c1n−1 )m
c0n = −ρ

Along with the initial condition that a10 = b10 = c10 = a00 = b00 = c00 = 0, all a, b, and c can be
solved. In particular,

b1n =


n−1


 1−(m+ρ) 2 2m(1 − ρ) + m(1 − ρ)

where n is odd

n


 1−(m+ρ) 2 2m(1 − ρ)

where n is even

1−m−ρ

1−m−ρ

b0n =


n−1


 1−(m+ρ) 2 2m(1 − ρ)(m + δ) + m(1 − ρ)
1−m−ρ





n
1−(m+ρ) 2

1−m−ρ

2m(1 − ρ)

where n is odd
where n is even
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These then lead to the following returns:

log(1 + Rn,t+1 ) =




a0

n−1

− a1n + (h − m)(1 − ρ)xt + (1 − ρ)(ut+1 )



a1n−1 − a0n + (l − m)(bn−1 + 1 − ρ)xt + (bn−1 + 1 − ρ)ut+1

t odd
t even

Notice the predictable component of stock returns depends on xt as before. Because only the
low realization periods, or newsy periods cash flow growth enters xt , only returns in those
periods will positively and negative predict future non-newsy and newsy periods returns,
respectively.
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APPENDIX C
Trading strategies, Sharpe ratios, and alphas
C.1. Time series
I convert the return predictability patterns that I document into trading strategies implementable in real time. Coefficients obtained by regressing future returns on signals, like
those documented in Table 2.4 and Table 2.11, are in principle returns to long short portfolios themselves (Fama and MacBeth (1973)).1 Hence the results in this section is to some
extent already implied by my return predicting results. However, the implied portfolios
often have look-ahead bias in their weights and are technically not implementable in real
time. Out of an abundance of caution, in this section I form portfolios with information
available in real time, and compute its Sharpe ratio and multi-factor alphas.
Starting the aggregate market strategy, at the end of each month t−1 I take the total return
of the aggregate market in the past four newsy months (potentially include month t − 1),
and compute the expanding window mean of this total return, which is its mean from the
beginning of the sample to month t − 1. I then take the difference between the total return
and its expanding window mean, and flip sign if month t is newsy to arrive at the demeaned
signal xt−1 . I then run a constrained time-series regression mktt = βxt−1 + 1 mktt−1 + ϵt ,
where mktt is the market return in month t, xt−1 is the said demeaned signal, and mktt−1 is
the expanding window mean of the market return up to month t − 1. Notice the coefficient
before mktt−1 is constrained to be 1. Denote estimated coefficient β as ct . The forecasted
market return at the end of month t for month t+1 is then ct xt +mktt . The portfolio weight
1

Consider the simplest case where you do a cross sectional regression of returns on one signal and a
constant. Denote P
the returns as the vector (r1 , r2 , ..., rn ) and the signal (x1 , x2 , ..., xn ). The coefficient on
n
P
(x −x)(ri −r)
Pn i
Pn xi −x
the signal is then i=1
= n
2
2 ri , where r and x are the cross sectional means of r
i=1
i=1 (xi −x)
i=1 (xi −x)
and x. Notice this coefficient value is the return to a portfolio of stocks, with the weight on stock i being
Pn xi −x
2 . Notice this weight sums to 0, and the portfolio is hence long short. Additionally, the weight
i=1 (xi −x)
Pn
Pn xi −x
ensures that the portfolio has unit exposure to the signal itself, i.e.
2 xi = 1, and therefore
i=1
i=1 (xi −x)
the scale of the portfolio is often not meaningful unless the signal is in interpretable unit. The Sharpe ratio
of the portfolio is always meaningful though.
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in my strategy is ct xt , which roughly has a mean of zero over time. Lastly, the portfolio
is scaled by a constant so that it has the same volatility as the aggregate market, which is
5.34% per month.2 This is so that the portfolio’s average return is in comparable unit as
the aggregate stock market.
It is worth noting that the forecasting system that I use can be applied to a generic signal.
The system also extends to a multivariate setting without having to worry about the difference in sample span for different signals—for missing signals one can just fill in a neutral
value of 0. Here I delegate the constant term in the regression to the expanding window
mean of past returns. This is to keep the forecasting system simple so that I observe my
signal’s effect in isolation. Campbell and Thompson (2008) put forth better options for the
purpose of optimal forecasting.
Table C.1 regresses the said time-series portfolio returns on a constant and contemporaneous factors, including the market, value, size, and momentum. The coefficients on the
constant are of interest. In column 1, the coefficient of 0.823 means that the portfolio
has an average return of 0.823% per month, which is about 10% per annum. This corresponds to an annualized Sharpe ratio of 0.44, which is about the same as that on the
aggregate market. It is worth noticing that explaining the sheer scale of this Sharpe ratio
is non-trivial when the underlying instrument is just the aggregate market: the equity premium puzzle (Mehra and Prescott (1985)) inspired sophisticated models developed by generations of scholars (e.g. Abel (1990)), Constantinides (1990), Campbell and Cochrane (1999),
Bansal and Yaron (2004), Rietz (1988), Barro (2006), Gabaix (2012), Wachter (2013)).
Therefore the predictability I document is worth thinking carefully about.
In column 2, we see that the strategy is indeed roughly market neutral, as designed. It leads
to a CAPM alpha of about 0.75% per month. In column 3 and 4 we see that the 3-factor
and 4-factor alphas of this strategy are 0.64% and 0.74% per month. It is worth noting that
2

One may argue that this scaling, even though it does not change the portfolio’s Sharpe ratio, still has
look-ahead bias in it, because the number 5.34% is not known in advance. This can similarly be dealt with
using an expanding window approach, and it leads to similar results.
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even though my trading strategy involves substantial rebalancing, the underlying instrument
is the aggregate market, and the incurred trading cost is likely lower than strategies that
require stock level rebalancing, such as the value, size, and the momentum factors.

C.2. Cross sectional
Having discussed the time series strategy I now move to the cross sectional strategy trading
on US industries. For each industry i and month t, I compute i’s total excess return of the
past four newsy months, and then cross sectionally demean with market cap weight at the
end of month t. I then flip the sign of this total excess return if month t + 1 is newsy to
arrive at the signal xi,t . I then compute a expanding window standard deviation σt of the
signal x across all industry-month up to month t, weighting by market cap divided by the
total market cap of the cross section. The portfolio weight is xi,t /σt winsorize at [-2, 2] to
make sure no extreme position is taken. Lastly, the portfolio is then scaled so that it has
the same volatility as the aggregate market excess return, which is 5.34% per month. Notice
this strategy is market neutral in each cross section.
Table C.2 regresses this cross sectional portfolio returns on the market, value, size, and
momentum factors. Column 1 shows that the average return of this portfolio is about 0.62%
per month, and the annualized Sharpe ratio is about 0.33. Across the rows we see that the
multi-factor alphas of this strategy is strongly positive, even though it declines as factors
are added in, because it has small positive loadings on the size and the momentum factors.
It is worth noting that the factor’s loading on the momentum factor is not very strong. This
is because it bets against continuation one third of the times, and it is at the industry level
and uses only newsy month returns as the predictors. Overall, this shows that the cross
sectional return predictability I document can also be translated into a trading strategy.
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Table C.1: Time series strategies and alphas
(1)
ts_pft

(2)
ts_pft
0.110
[0.88]

(3)
ts_pft
-0.021
[-0.25]
0.361**
[2.14]
0.391
[1.29]

0.823***
[4.29]

0.748***
[4.34]

0.635***
[3.83]

M KTt − Rft−1
HM Lt
SM Bt
M OMt
const

(4)
ts_pft
-0.046
[-0.57]
0.309*
[1.88]
0.386
[1.25]
-0.112
[-1.07]
0.743***
[3.90]

N
1,136
1,136
1,136
1,134
R-sq
0.000
0.008
0.082
0.087
Column 1 shows results from the following monthly time-series regression: ts_pft = α + ϵt .
Here ts_pft is our time-series portfolio return in month t. This portfolio longs or shorts the
aggregate market for a given month, and the weight is proportional to the previous-monthend forecasted market return subtracting the expanding window mean of aggregate market
returns and scaled to have the same volatility as the aggregate market excess return, which
is 5.34% per month. The said forecasted market return is constructed with the following
steps: 1) demean the total return of the past four newsy months (January, April, July,
and October) with the expanding window mean; 2) flip sign if the next month is newsy to
arrive at our signal; 3) regress the aggregate market return on lag one month signal and
the expanding window mean aggregate market return based on data available in real time
at each month, and with the coefficient on the expanding window mean aggregate market
return constrained to 1; 4) compute the forecast as the coefficient estimated at a given
month times the signal plus the expanding window mean aggregate market return. Notice
the forecast is designed to use only data available in real time. Column 2-4 add in the
market, value, size, and momentum factor returns on the right hand side. In column 1, the
coefficient of the constant represents the average return of time-series portfolio. In column
2-4 it represents its alphas with different factor models. Data are monthly from 1926 to
2021. Returns are all in percentage unit. T-stats computed with White standard errors are
reported in the square brackets.
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Table C.2: Cross sectional strategies and alphas
(1)
cs_pft

(2)
cs_pft
-0.026
[-0.73]

(3)
cs_pft
-0.067
[-1.46]
0.001
[0.01]
0.211*
[1.79]

0.619***
[3.89]

0.638***
[3.98]

0.621***
[3.90]

M KTt − Rft−1
HM Lt
SM Bt
M OMt
const

(4)
cs_pft
-0.054
[-1.14]
0.028
[0.29]
0.214*
[1.81]
0.057
[0.69]
0.566***
[3.27]

N
1,136
1,136
1,136
1,134
R-sq
0.000
0.001
0.015
0.017
Column 1 shows results from the following monthly time-series regression: cs_pft = α + ϵt .
Here cs_pft is our cross-sectional portfolio return in month t. This portfolio takes long
and short positions on industries in a given month, and the weight is constructed with the
following steps: 1) for each industry-month, compute the total excess return of the past
four newsy months (January, April, July, and October), and cross sectionally demean with
market cap weight; 2) flip sign if the next month is newsy; 3) scale by expanding window
standard deviation of the signal, and winsorize at [-2, 2] to make sure no extreme position
is taken. The portfolio is then scaled so that it has the same volatility as the aggregate
market excess return, which is 5.34% per month. Column 2-4 add in the market, value, size,
and momentum factor returns on the right hand side. In column 1, the coefficient of the
constant represents the average return of time-series portfolio. In column 2-4 it represents
its alphas with different factor models. Data are monthly from 1926 to 2021. Returns are
all in percentage unit. T-stats computed with White standard errors are reported in the
square brackets.
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